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The paper designs an optimal payment system for a group of producers
implementing it empirically. It shows how to implement the ﬁrst best
through higher prices for better quality commodities, deriving the optimal
pricing schedule. It also takes into account producers’ heterogeneity by
modelling ineﬃciency and illustrating how technical eﬃciency interacts
with producers’ ability to produce output for a given level of inputs and
hence aﬀects revenues. The technology and the technical eﬃciency of
producers are then estimated with a stochastic production function model.
The estimation results are then used to simulate the pricing scheme.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The payment systems for raw commodities and intermediate products deﬁne
one of the most critical relationships of many vertically related industries, since
they establish how revenues are distributed among growers and processing ﬁrms.
Intermediate products payment systems also have a pivotal role in setting the
incentives that growers and processing ﬁrms face: not only do they heavily in-
ﬂuence the incentives to improve technical eﬃciency, they also have far-reaching
implications for investment decisions.
For these reasons, measuring and evaluating the right attributes in raw ma-
terials, commodities, and intermediate products is a common problem in many
sectors of the economy (Barkley and Porter, 1996; Buccola and Iizuka, 1997;
Ladd and Martin, 1976). This happens to be true in food industries, where
grapes are used for wine production, milk for cheese, canes for sugar, beans for
coﬀee, but also in other industries, for instance with chips used in the com-
puter industry, ores in steel production, steel in construction works, crude oil in
reﬁned oil production, just to name a few examples.
In this paper we show how to design an optimal payment system for a group
of producers using mainly production data information. We ﬁrst show how it
is possible to implement the ﬁrst best through higher prices for better quality
commodities, deriving the optimal pricing schedule from a dual speciﬁcation of
the problem, i.e., with a restricted revenue function. We ﬁnd that the quality
choices of the optimal contract depend on the eﬃciency of producers and on the
technological relationship between quality and quantity. The optimal pricing
scheme, moreover, plainly mirrors market’s preferences for quality.
We take into account producers’ heterogeneity by modeling ineﬃciency and
illustrating how technical eﬃciency interacts with producers’ ability to produce
outputs for a given level of inputs and hence aﬀects revenues. After reformulat-
ing the pricing scheme in terms of primal measures, we estimate the technology
and the technical eﬃciency of producers via a stochastic production function
model. We hence use the estimation results to simulate the optimal quality
choices and pricing scheme.
This study combines a theoretical model for contract design under symmet-
ric information for a group of producers with the contributions of the literature
on the parametric estimation of technology using Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA). By combining the contributions of these two strands of the literature,
we design an optimal pricing scheme for a cooperative using an estimation of
the technology. We use the pricing scheme with a speciﬁc dataset for market,
weather, and soil quality conditions to show the impact on the choices and pay-
ments received by a group of farmers involved in grapes production in Italy. The
model and the methodology however are general enough to be implementable
for other groups and other industries as well.
The plan of the paper is the following. In the next section we explain the
relevance of the problem at hand and review some of the literature. In the
following we introduce a model of the behavior of producers and the cooperative
and show what would be the ﬁrst best pricing scheme. We then formulate
2the pricing scheme in terms of a primal speciﬁcation of the technology, i.e., a
production function, and of market demand information. We then show how to
implement it using stochastic frontier analysis. We illustrate the data used in
the empirical application in the following section. After introducing the results
of the technology estimation, we simulate the results of the estimated pricing
scheme and compare with the actual pricing schedule used by the group of
producers analyzed. To conclude, we highlight some possible improvements for
the methodology and directions for future research.
2 Facts and literature review
The wine-world market is characterized by two principal wine suppliers, the Eu-
ropean, based on the Appellation of Origin (AO) type of organization, and the
New World one, mainly promoted by new countries, with an organization based
on the type of grapes. Wines in the AO system are often made by blending
speciﬁc and sometimes local grapes varieties; their grapes production is regu-
lated, with a maximum yield allowed per unit of land; and their production
regions are very delimited. In other words, wine-making in the European Union
is very regulated and based on tradition, with a big role assigned to local wines
which name is generally associated with the production region, e.g., Bordeaux,
Chianti, Rioja. The AO system has proven successful in guaranteeing a good
reputation for many European wines and in assuring relatively high proﬁts for
wine producers, even for the relatively small vineyards typical of most European
countries (Berthomeau, 2002).
Having traditionally been the biggest producers and exporters of wine, coun-
tries like France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the last few years have endured,
however, a tremendous growth of New World wine-makers. Indeed, the wine
producers of Australia, California, Chile, and other emerging wine producing
countries, are challenging the European leadership in world markets (Anderson,
2001; Economist, 1999). Common characteristics of the emerging wine produc-
ing countries are the lack of detailed rules, i.e., the freedom to experiment with
new techniques; the bigger size of the farming, wine-making and trading oper-
ations, much bigger than the European ones; the production and marketing of
wines according to single varieties, e.g., Chardonnay, sometimes associated with
the production region; and a very intense use of marketing investments.
Contrary to the New World countries, the wine industry in Europe is very
fragmented and appears relatively uninterested by the consolidation processes
that are taking place worldwide, especially in Australia and the USA (Econo-
mist, 2003; Marsch, 2003). Apart from some notable exceptions, e.g., the Cham-
pagne, Bordeaux, or Tuscany regions, the wine industry in Europe is made of
many small ﬁrms, which may lack adequate capital for the required investments
in new technologies and marketing policies (Saulpic and Tanguy, 2004). A par-
tial solution to the size problem, according to some practitioners, may be the
collective organization by farmers through cooperatives. Indeed, cooperatives
in the European wine industry are very common and in some regions have a
3considerable market share of production and processing facilities.1
The cooperative movement in the wine sector, however, has been suﬀering
for a reputation for low quality,2 lack of investment, and often the inability to
retain the better members (Touzard et al., 2000). One of the critical problems
for cooperatives is the remuneration of members’ raw commodities, e.g., grapes.
Indeed, in many instances cooperatives have been plagued by excess supply of
grapes of low quality which could only be processed to make relatively low qual-
ity and cheap wines (Golan and Shalit, 1993). By producing low quality wines,
producers face tougher competition, often leading to losses or level of proﬁts not
high enough to remunerate investments. Better members, i.e., members with
raw commodities of better quality, often ﬁnd more remunerative market outlets
by leaving the cooperative, which remains with the worst (quality) members.
By changing remuneration schemes, it may be argued, cooperatives and other
producer’s groups may improve the quality of the raw commodities delivered
by their members, commanding higher prices for processed commodities and
ensuring higher proﬁt levels for members (Jarrige and Touzard, 2001).
Starting with the paper by Sexton (1986), it has been recognized that it may
be better for the stability of a cooperative to use a non-linear pricing scheme.
Recognizing the private information regarding diﬀerent members’ technology,
Vercammen et al. (1996) take into account asymmetric information and show
that a non-linear price could improve over the standard linear pricing even with
asymmetric information. Bourgeon and Chambers (1999) show that when the
bargaining power of a group of farmers corresponds to its relative importance
in the farm population, the quantities produced are the ﬁrst-best levels. De-
partures from equal sharing, i.e., redistribution of surplus, appear when the
bargaining power of a group does not match its relative importance in the farm
population.
Most of the contributions in this topic however consider the quantity choice
problem and its optimal remuneration. Few contributions deal with quality
remuneration in a cooperative setting. Lopez and Spreen (1987) consider the
case of sugarcane cooperatives and compare two payment systems, a traditional
and a new one. With the traditional payment, the processing costs are pooled
and charged among producers proportionally to sugar production, while with the
proposed new method some costs are assigned to individual producers according
to their actual contribution to total operating costs. Lopez and Spreen show
that their method may improve eﬃciency almost two-fold.
The sugar cane industry is indeed an instance in which the use of diﬀerent
payment systems is relatively well documented. There are indeed a number
of diﬀerent types of payments which may be separated into three main broad
groups: ﬁxed cane price systems, ﬁxed revenue sharing systems, and variable
revenue sharing systems (LMC, 2002). In the ﬁxed price system, still present
in very large sugar industries such as in China, India, and Pakistan, farmers
1In the early 90s, for instance, in Italy the market share of cooperatives in the wine sector
was about 55%, in Spain 70%, and in France about 39-74% (Cogeca, 1998).
2“.. co-ops, which often lead to lowest-common-denominator wines - it’s hard to control
the quality of the grapes produced by members ..” (Echikson, 2005: P4).
4receive a ﬁxed price per tonne of cane, with no premium or discounts paid for
cane quality. Its key weakness is the lack of a link with the actual sugar price
and thus it represents “.. a lopsided arrangement through which growers and
millers do not share price risk..” (LMC, 2002: 2).
Under the ﬁxed revenue sharing system, revenues are shared on the basis
of a ﬁxed percentage distribution between growers and millers. In this system,
cane prices and mill margins are linked to sugar prices, but the ﬁxed basis
can weaken the incentive to improve technical performance and cane quality
for both growers and millers. The variable revenue sharing system is the most
sophisticated and is based on a formula ensuring that, beyond a benchmark level
of cane quality and factory eﬃciency, growers are the residual claimants for cane
quality improvements and millers cash-in the improvements in sucrose recovery
at the factory. The system ensures that, at the margin, increased revenues from
improvements in cane quality accrue to the grower, while millers capture any
gains from milling eﬃciency (Larson and Borrell, 2001).
Touzard et al. (2001) consider the payment systems of the wine coopera-
tives in South-France and distinguish them into three main groups. The more
traditional system, still used in one sixth of the surveyed cooperatives, is mainly
based on sugar content, oﬀering a linear price for sugar content based on the
average price for the wine sold by the coop.3 A c c o r d i n gt ot h ea u t h o r s ,t h i s
ﬁrst system is easy to manage but it does not seem to recognize the diversity of
grapes delivered by the members and thus renders the cooperative a procurer
of undiﬀerentiated raw commodities.
A more common method, found in around half of the cooperatives inter-
viewed, is used to remunerate varietal grapes such as Chardonnay, Merlot, etc.
when they are particularly appreciated in the market. It uses a modiﬁed formula
of the above mentioned method4 and thus it applies a quality concept which is
a priory based on technical criteria without much consideration for the market
eﬀects.
Last, a third set of methods is used in one-third of cooperatives, and it
diﬀerentiates across diﬀerent plots according to their contribution to the sales
of the cooperative.5 According to Touzard et al. (2001), this set recognizes
the eﬀorts made by the member, but it is more diﬃcult to implement since it
requires more information, and it leads to a greater inequality among members.
In essence, it creates tensions among members to the extent that it introduces
market forces into the cooperative.
3For the ith producer, the remuneration is Ri = v (P − C)
[
j
(qij sij),w h e r ev<1 is
the coeﬃcient for the transformation grapes-to-wine, P is the average price at which the
cooperative sells the wine, C is the average cost for the transformation of the grapes, qij and
sij are respectively the weight and the sugar content for the jth plot.
4If we call A the ﬁrst method, this second one is simply Ab j,w i t hbj > 1,f o rt h ep r e m i u m
varietal grapes.
5For the ith producer, the remuneration is Ri =
[
j
(qij (Pij − C)),w h e r ePij is the price
at which the cooperative sells the wine coming from the jth plot, C is the average cost for the
transformation of the grapes, qij is the weight.
5Ad i ﬀerent strand of the literature considers how to use the results of con-
tract design under asymmetric information with a richer speciﬁcation of the
production technology. Bogetoft (2000), for example, shows how to use DEA
estimates of the technology to design an optimal contract between a Principal
and an Agent or a group of Agents. In a related series of papers, he exploits this
idea under diﬀerent information settings, that is with moral hazard and adverse
selection, and with single and multiple output speciﬁcation.
In the next section we represent the choices facing producers and we show
how the eﬃciency parameter allow to distinguish among diﬀerent producers and
their choices. We then introduce the technology, showing how the eﬃciency pa-
rameter enters the primal representation of the technology which may be useful
for the empirical implementation. We the proceed with the empirical estima-
tion of the optimal pricing rule found in the theoretical section and expressed
in terms of the primal parameters.
3 The model
A set of producers in a given region may sell their raw commodity into com-
petitive markets or deliver it to a cooperative to be processed and marketed
collectively.6 After selling the processed product, e.g., wine, and subtracting
processing and marketing costs, the cooperative pays the members according to
the quantity and quality delivered. Suppose the N producers, i ∈ I = {1,..,N},
face the same production conditions and transform a vector of inputs x ∈ <L
+
into output y ∈ <+ and s ∈ <+,w h e r ey is a scalar indicating the production
level in terms of quantity of output, i.e., total amount of grapes production per
unit of land, and s is the output attribute, i.e., the components of grapes, like
for example sugar content.7 In this study we are interested in using a pricing
schedule for grapes that takes into account their quality, i.e., sugar content.
While a priory we do not impose any form on this pricing scheme, to give some
generality we want to allow for the derivation of a possible non-linear pricing
scheme. For this purpose, following what is standard in the literature on non-
linear pricing (see, e.g., Wilson, 1993), we allow for producers’ heterogeneity
and introduce an eﬃciency parameter θ.
Producers are heterogeneous in the sense that some are more eﬃcient than
others, and are distinguished by their type or eﬃciency parameter θ.W ea s s u m e
that the type of the producer, θ,i sr e l a t e dt oh o we ﬀectively outputs (y,s) are
produced for a given input bundle x. For empirical tractability, it is convenient
to normalize the eﬃciency type over the support Θ ∈ (−∞,0].W e c a n t h e n
specify the technology in terms of the output set P(x,s,θ) deﬁned as
P(x,s,θ)={y ∈ <+ : x can produce y given (s,θ)}.
6We consider the case of a cooperative but the analysis, with minor modiﬁcations, would
remain valid with any processing ﬁrm buying raw inputs from a pool of upstream ﬁrms.
7In many wine cooperatives sugar content is the single most important quality attribute
a n dt h em o r et h eb e t t e rt oi n c r e a s ew i n e ’ sq u a l i t y .T h i sm a yb ea sw e l lt h ec a s ew i t hp r o t e i n s
content in milk for cheese production, sugar content in sugarcane cooperatives, etc.
6We assume that for all x in <L
+, P(x,s,θ) has the following properties:
(P1) P(x,s,θ) is closed;
(P2) P(x,s,θ) is a convex set;
(P3) (y,s) ∈ P(x,s,θ) ⇒ (yλ,sλ) ∈ P(x,s,θ),0 <λ≤ 1.
(P4) P(x,s,θ)=P(x,s)+θ, with P(x,s) ≥ |θ|.
The ﬁrst three properties are standard: (P1) and (P2) are regularity con-
ditions allowing to use duality theory, while (P3) allows outputs to be weakly
disposable. The last property, (P4),i st h ek e yt os e et h ei m p a c to ft h ee ﬃ-
ciency type on production: an increase in the type causes an additive increase
in the output set, and P(x,s) ≥ |θ| avoids the possibility of producing negative
output.
The problem for a representative farmer may be represented as the following:
max
y,s,x {p(s)y − wx : y ∈ P(x,s,θ)},
where p(s) is the unitary payment, which may be contingent on quality level
s, received by the producer from the cooperative and w is the factor price for
inputs x. This program may be divided into two steps, the choice of the input
bundle and the choice of the output bundle. We concentrate on the output side,
in particular on the choices of quality by the farmers given the market prices
or the payments oﬀered by the cooperative. We thus represent each producer’s
technology by her restricted revenue function, R(p,x,s,θ),
R(p,x,s,θ)=m a x
y {py : y ∈ P(x,s,θ)}, (1)
where p is the price received, s is the quality of the output, and θ the eﬃciency
parameter which is assumed to be distributed according to a G(θ) strictly in-
creasing and smooth on the support Θ. We also assume that producers are in-
dexed negatively according to their eﬃciency, i.e., Rθ (p,x,s,θ) < 0. In addition,
we assume that the eﬃciency parameter ranks both production and the marginal
revenue eﬀect of quality, that is Rpθ (p,x,s,θ) < 0 and Rsθ (p,x,s,θ) < 0.
Notice that in the restricted revenue function of eq. (1) we are considering
the maximization over one output and hence we have the following
R(p,x,s,θ)=pmax
y {y : y ∈ P(x,s,θ)}, (2)
= pR(1,x,s,θ),
that is, the revenue function is the output price times the production function.
Producers could sell their products to a competitive market, in which the
prevailing price would be pm, independent of the actions taken by the producers
or the cooperative. Analogously, it could be a situation in which the cooper-
ative does not pay according to quality but it only oﬀers a linear price given
a minimum quality standard is reached. In any case, producers would choose
quality s a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n g :
Π(θ)=m a x
s {R(pm,x,s,θ)},
7which ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution are the following:
Rs(pm,x,s ∗(θ),θ)=0 ,
where Rs(·)=∂R




0 <θimplies that y∗(θ
0) >y ∗(θ).
Looking at the problem for the cooperative, we can suppose its manage-
ment has the objective of maximizing the members’ returns by the choice of
payments.8 In other words, the group of producers’s management needs to de-
sign an optimal payment schemes to induce members to deliver a quality raw
commodity to the cooperative according to market demand and at the mini-
mum cost for them. The management is considering giving an extra payment to
members in exchange for better deliveries, i.e., some quality requirements. We
assume that s and y are observable and contractible, and thus the cooperative
may oﬀer a payment contingent on them, in particular on s.S i n c et h eo p t i m a l
choice of s by the farmer depends on her eﬃciency parameter, the price is also
a function of the eﬃciency parameter. In other words, p(θ)=b p(s(θ)).
The management of the cooperative is planning to oﬀer a set of speciﬁc
contracts, {p(θ),s(θ):θ ∈ Θ}, to the members. If these agree to participate,
they would receive an increased price for the delivery of better raw commodities.
Otherwise, they can sell their commodity to a competitive market or remain with
the old pricing scheme,9 in any case receiving Π(θ), their outside opportunity.
Hence, a farmer of type θ will participate voluntarily in such a scheme iﬀ:
R(p(θ),x,s(θ),θ) ≥ Π(θ). (IR)
The cooperative’s problem is to design a pricing scheme that rewards quality
and breaks even. We assume that in the market for the processed commodity
the cooperative receives a price P(S(θ)) that is a function of the average quality









∂p is, by the envelope theorem, the optimal produc-
tion level chosen by the producers and hence
R
Θ R(1,s,x,θ)dG(θ) is the total
8See Appendix 1 for the results of a survey of wine coops whose Directors and managers
where asked about their objectives.
9Wilson, in the context of Ramsey pricing, shows that it is possible to design non-linear
prices (for quantity) that leaves no consumers worse oﬀ than with previous linear prices, i.e.,
Pareto-improving tariﬀs.
10To simplify, we consider this price to be net of variable processing costs and we assume
there are no ﬁxed costs for processing facilities. We are aware of the literature on the equilibria
and diﬀerent pricing schemes when there are ﬁxed costs (see, e.g., Vercammen et al., 1996), but
adding them would complicate the problem without changing the main results and intuitions
of this analysis.
8production for the group of producers. Eq. (3) says that the average quality for
the group of producers is the weighted average of the quality levels for diﬀer-
ent types, with the weight given by the production for each type. The revenue
for the group of producers is then given by P(S(θ))
R
Θ R(1,x,s,θ)dG(θ).O n
the other hand, the net processing revenue is redistributed back to members
via the payments, and hence the total payments for the group of producers are R
Θ p(θ)R(1,x,s,θ)dG(θ), i.e., the average price times the total production.
















We can simplify by assuming that





















The break-even constraint in (BC) ensures that the net processing revenues are
redistributed back to members via the payments. Let Q(θ)=R(p(θ),x,s(θ),θ)
be the producer’s return given the price-quality contract structure. Then, we
assume that the cooperative’s objective function is to maximize members’ total
revenues, N
R











assuming there are N members. Because we are maximizing returns subject to
a budget constraint, we can avoid introducing a reservation utility constraint
except at the bottom of the eﬃciency distribution so that we can ensure everyone
participates voluntarily.
3.1 First best
We assume that producers in the competitive market face a price that does
not recognize the quality diﬀerentials.11 T h ec o o p e r a t i v eo nt h eo t h e rh a n d
11In some cases agricultural products are paid according to their characteristics. For in-
stance, when forward contracts are available, the commodities usually have to reach a min-
imum quality standard. With other contracts, the price may even be contingent on quality.
However, for simplicity we assume this is not the case here. Having members’ outside oppor-
tunities depending on quality would require a diﬀerent analysis, since there would most likely
be type-dependent outside opportunities.
9is envisioning a pricing scheme that pays according to quality with a general
pricing scheme that likely sorts out producers with diﬀerent eﬃciency para-
meters. Quality is costly and to ensure voluntary participation it needs to be
paid. However, even in the case of symmetric information, in which the coop-
erative can observe the member’s type, the cooperative’s optimal policy must
accommodate for the break-even constraint to ensure that proﬁts created are
redistributed back to producers.
Although the problem in eq. (6) involves choosing p and s for each type,
conventional maximization techniques can be used and hence we may write the










where µ is a Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. The Lagrange
multiplier µ gives the shadow value of the increase in payments to each member
type from relaxing the constraint on the total revenues received by the group.
The management chooses p and s for each type, i.e., it chooses inﬁnitely
many p(θ) and s(θ).12 Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions for the choice variables
and assuming interior solutions we can have the following
∂L
∂p
= R(1,x,s,θ) − µR(1,x,s,θ)=0 , ∀θ (8)
∂L
∂s














Notice that from the ﬁrst of these equations we get that µ(θ)=1 ,a n di f




Substituting this last equation in the third equation above, and assuming that













12Wilson (1993, ch. 4) derives the optimal tariﬀ starting from the demand proﬁle (a rep-
resentation of preferences that keeps more information than the aggregate demand regarding
consumers’ heterogeneity), but he also shows its equivalent derivation using the calculus of
variation and pointwise maximization.
10The ﬁrst equation in the system (9) says that the shadow value of the increased
revenue for the cooperative is equal to one, i.e., for each additional dollar re-
ceived by the group, its value is unitary. This is easy to see once we recognize
that each dollar received is distributed back to members. The other interesting
equation is the third one. Each member should receive a unitary payment for
quality which is dependent on what the group gets from a unit of quality, i.e., the
coeﬃcient b, “corrected” by an adjustment factor which depends on the trade-oﬀ
between quantity and quality. Indeed, the denominator is the marginal impact
on the production level of an increase in quality, Rs(1,x,s,θ),i m p a c tw h i c hi s
most likely negative, i.e., there is a trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. This
marginal impact is “weighted” by the production level R(1,x,s,θ).
The third equation in the system (9) above says that if the denominator is
negative, i.e., there is in fact a trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity, then the
cooperative should pay members a greater price than the market unit price for
quality. In words, if the technology relationships are such that an increase in
quality calls forth a reduction in supply, then all producers are better-oﬀ when
oﬀered a price for quality that is higher than what the market would pay for
quality. The higher the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity and the higher
should be the price for quality.
4 Empirical implementation
To implement the pricing scheme derived in the previous section, we pursue the
following strategy. First of all, we take into account the heterogeneity among
producers borrowing from the literature on eﬃciency analysis. Indeed, since
a good deal of variability in the production choices is unaccounted for by the
explanatory variables considered, we believe that the analysis cast in the frame-
work of the eﬃciency literature can help in making the best use of the data
available for the estimation, that is in explaining producers’ heterogeneity. In
the eﬃciency literature on stochastic frontiers the distance of each ﬁrm from the
frontier is expressed as a composite error term: one, a symmetric component, is
the standard white noise, normally distributed with zero mean, while the other
asymmetric component reﬂects ﬁrm’s ineﬃciency.
The dataset available is driving some of the choices for the empirical im-
plementation. The data are provided by the “Istituto Agrario di San Michele
all’Adige”, located in the Northern Italian Alps. As we extensively explain in
a section to follow, members of the cooperative that participated in the ex-
perimental study were implementing the agronomic practices suggested by the
cooperative’s agronomist, and responded to the economic incentives common
to all members. Indeed, their production was paid according to the schemes
normally implemented by the cooperative for its members. Given the nature
of the data, to be described shortly, we ﬁnd most appropriate to use a primal
approach estimating a restricted production function.13
13An alternative would be to estimate the techology parameters via a dual approach, for
instance using a revenue function or better a proﬁt function, but this approach would be based
114.1 The estimation of the technology
In this section we represent the choices of the members of the cooperative and
present the empirical strategy to estimate the technology. Given the data that
are available, and the theory we derived earlier, in particular eq. (2), a produc-
tion function estimation is the most suitable approach.
To proceed with the empirical implementation of the pricing rule derived
in earlier sections, we can show that the asymmetric production function is
additive as in the following
R(1,x,s,θ)=r(1,x,s,)+θ, (10)
where R(1,x,s,θ) is the restricted production function, and r(1,x,s,) and θ are
its two components. Indeed, the additive structure of the production function
is related to property (P4) by the following
P(x,s,θ)={y : R(1,x,s,θ) ≥ y}, (11)
= {y : r(1,x,s)+θ ≥ y},
= {y + θ − θ : r(1,x,s) ≥ y − θ},
= θ + {y − θ : r(1,x,s) ≥ y − θ},
= θ + P(x,s).
To be able to estimate the pricing rule derived earlier, we opt for a relatively














βslxl + βss, (12)
where xl are the inputs, and s is the sugar content of grapes. Notice that







βslxl + βs. (13)





























mostly on economic data, which on the inputs side were not available for this study.






















Notice that the optimal quality level depends on the demand parameters via
the term − a
2b. In addition, there is a “correction factor” which depends on




βslxl + βs. Since this latter is presumably
negative, the correction factor is negative and increasing with eﬃciency. In
other words, we should expect greater quality production the lower the trade-
oﬀ with quantity and the greater the eﬃciency of producers.
In order to obtain the optimal pricing rule in eq. (9), notice that with an
























Notice that to estimate eq. (17) (and eq. (15)), we need an estimate of b,t h e
unit price of sugar in the market, i.e., the marginal willingness to pay that can
be inferred from the aggregate inverse demand curve for quality, and of a,t h e
vertical intercept of the inverse demand curve for quality. Another important
piece of information is related to θ, for which we get an estimate b θi using the
stochastic frontier approach we will introduce shortly. Moreover, for the quality
s we use the optimal value computed with eq. (15). In addition, we need to
estimate the coeﬃcients of the asymmetric production function to get b β0, b βlj,
b βl, b βsl,a n db βs. Finally, notice that we compute the optimal quality level and
the optimal pricing schedule based on the average input values, xl.







rs(1,x,s(θ)) ,a n ds o
we obtain that the optimal pricing rule now becomes
p(θ)=a + bs(θ). (18)
The optimal pricing schedule is a function of the optimal quality level, s(θ),a n d
hence of θ,t h ei n e ﬃciency parameter to be estimated. Once one estimates the
optimal quality level s(θ), eq. (18) above says that the optimal price schedule
13is a linear function of the optimal quality, where all parameters of the pricing
schedule are those of the inverse market demand. In other words, it is worth
noticing that the optimal price thus reﬂects the market preferences for quality,
that is the inverse demand parameters (see eq. (5)). Thus in a group in which
the objective for the management is to maximize members’ welfare, the cooper-
ative oﬀers a price schedule that exactly matches that faced by the group itself
on the market.
4.2 Econometric strategy
In this section we introduce the parametric estimation of the asymmetric pro-
d u c t i o nf r o n t i e ri n t r o d u c e di ne q . ( 1 2 )u s ing cross-sectional data. In general,
we can specify the production frontier as the following (modiﬁed from Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt, 1976; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000)
R(1,xi,s i,θ i)=r(1,xi,s i;β)+θi, (19)
where R(1,xi,s i,θi) is the maximum (scalar) output of producer i, xi is the vec-
tor of inputs used by producer, si is the quality of production, and r(1,xi,s i;β)
is the production frontier where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
In this formulation, R(1,xi,s i,θ i) is the maximum feasible value of r(1,xi,s i;β)
if and only if θi =0 .W h e nθi < 0, there is a shortfall of observed output from
maximum feasible output and this provides a measure of the eﬃciency of type
θi. Since in this deterministic frontier the entire shortfall of production is at-
tributed to the (technical) ineﬃciency, to recognize that random shocks can
aﬀect production it is useful to use a stochastic production frontier like the
following
R(1,xi,s i,θ i)=r(1,xi,s i;β)+vi + θi, (20)
where r(1,xi,s i;β)+vi is now the stochastic production frontier with vi a
standard noise component to incorporate the eﬀect of random shocks on each
producer.14 We choose a stochastic frontier since the random error compo-
nent allows to account for measurement errors and other random factors, such
as weather and unobserved soil conditions, that are important in agricultural
production like in grapes production for wine-making.
The stochastic frontier models thus acknowledge the fact that random shocks
outside the control of producers can aﬀect output and allow to estimate the
parameters of the technology plus the ineﬃciency term of each producer. If the














βslxli + βssi + vi − ui,
(21)
14The alternative would be a deterministic frontier that while parametric, hence permitting
to estimate the parameters β of the technology, would attribute all deviations from maximum
production to ineﬃciency.
14where vi is the two-sided noise component and ui = −θi is the nonnega-
tive technical ineﬃciency component of the error term that guarantees that
R(1,xi,s i,θi) ≤ r(1,xi,s i;β).
We also want to take into account the possibility that some exogenous vari-
ables z may inﬂuence the eﬃciency of producers.15 We thus specify the asym-
m e t r i cc o m p o n e n tw i t ht h ef o l l o w i n g
ui = γ0 +
P X
p
γpzpi + ei, (22)
where p =1 ,..,P are the exogenous variables that aﬀect the technical eﬃciency
of producers.16
In the composed error models it is usually assumed that the noise component
is iid and symmetric, distributed independently of ui.E v e n i f ui and vi are
distributed independently of xli, the estimation of eq. (21) by OLS does not
provide consistent estimates of β0,s i n c eE(εi)=−E(ui),w h e r eεi = vi − ui,
and does not provide estimates of producer-speciﬁc technical eﬃciency. In other
words, while OLS estimation results for the coeﬃcients besides the intercept are
consistent, to have consistent estimates of β0 and estimates of the producer-
speciﬁci n e ﬃciency terms ui, other estimation methods are required, all based
on speciﬁc distributional assumptions for ui and vi.
Maximum likelihood (ML) methods and methods of moments can be used.
For both methods, distributional assumptions are needed for estimating both
the parameters and the ineﬃciency terms. Diﬀerent options are available, such
as the half-normal, the exponential, the gamma, but the more common model
is the Normal-Half Normal model.17 Stevenson (1980) suggested a general-
ization of the half-normal speciﬁcation, the truncated normal, that can be
considered when the asymmetric error component has a systematic compo-
nent, such as γ0 +
PP
p γpzpi, associated with the exogenous variables. In-




u), that is the one-sided error component representing
technical ineﬃciency has a truncated normal structure with a variable mode de-
pending on the z’s. Assuming that vi ∼ N(0,σ2




and that ui and vi are distributed independently (but not identically), the pa-
rameters in eq. (21) can be estimated using MLE.18
15Notice that, as it is standard in the literature, we consider x to be a vector of variables that
aﬀect the frontier (maximal) level of output, while z a set of variables tha aﬀect the deviation
of output from the frontier, i.e., the technical ineﬃciency. Both x and z are considered
exogenous, that is there is a lack of feedback from y, the production, to x and z (Wang and
Schmidt, 2002).
16Not including the intercept term, γ0,i nt h em e a nm a yr e s u l ti nb i a s e de s t i m a t o r s( B a t t e s e
and Coelli, 1995: footnote 3).
17Ritter and Simar suggests the use of simple distributions, such as the half normal or the
exponential. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000: 90) argues that “.. the choice between the two
one-parameter densities is largely immaterial ..”.
18Assuming that the regressors are independent of the error terms, while common a practice
i nt h el i t e r a t u r eo ns t o c h a s t i cf r o n t i e ra n a l y s i s ,m a yb ep r o b l e m a t i cw h e nm o r et h a no n e
15With the maximum likelihood estimation method, in the case of the Normal-















where µ is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at
zero, and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution. Since the density



































































































u and λ = σu
σv are estimated jointly with the technology
parameters β,a n dφ(·) is the standard normal density function (Kumbhakar
and Lovell, 2000).
The log-likelihood function for a sample of I producers, recognizing that the
asymmetric error term has a systematic component, is a simple generalization
of that of the truncated normal model with constant mode µ being replaced by
t h ev a r i a b l em o d eµi = γ0 +
PP
p γpzpi (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000: 267). We
thus have the following
output is considered for estimation, like in the case of our restricted production function.
Moreover, when using non-experimental data it is possible that some problems of simultaneous
equations estimation may in fact arise also with respect to inputs.










































u,a n dei =
vi −ui = Ri(1,s,x,θ)−ri(1,s,x;β) are the residuals obtained from estimating
eq. (21).
Using ML, once we obtain estimates of ei = vi − ui, it is possible to
obtain the information about ui by using the conditional distribution of ui
given ei (Jondrow et al., 1982). For a Truncated normal speciﬁcation, with
ui ∼ N+(µ,σ2
u), and with the frontier production function deﬁned directly in



















Given that f(u|e) is distributed as N+(µ∗,σ∗2), the mean (or the mode) can be

















and noticing that we are working with the original units of production, i.e., not
in log form, we can go from the point estimates of ui to the estimates of the
technical eﬃciency for each ﬁrm via the following
TEi =
xiβ − b ui
xiβ
, (31)
where b ui is given by E(ui|ei) (Battese and Coelli, 1988).
Notice however that regardless of which estimator is used, the estimates of
the technical ineﬃciency are inconsistent and nothing can be done to overcome
this problem with cross-sectional data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000: 78). A
possible solution to this problem comes from panel data analysis. Unfortunately,
as we explain in the next sections, some of the data do not vary across years
and so panel data estimation is not possible. In the next section we present
the data used for the estimation and then the results of the ML estimation
using a composite error model based on the truncated normal assumption of
the distribution of the ui error term.
19Battese and Coelli (1988, 1993, 1995) and Coelli (1996) derive the predictor for ui and
for the technical eﬃciency distinguishing between the case in which the production frontier is
expressed either in the orignal units or in log form, e.g., Cobb-Douglas.
174.3 The data
To implement empirically the methodology presented in the previous sections we
use data provided by the “Istituto Agrario di San Michele all’Adige”, located
near Trento, in the Northern Italian Alps. The mission of this experimental
station is to investigate the best agronomic practices and varieties to match
the potential of diﬀerent production zones in the region and diﬀerent trials are
undertaken every year with this purpose.
The data we employ in this paper come from a study performed by the
Istituto, on behalf of SAV, a wine cooperative, to investigate the productive
potential of diﬀerent varieties of grapes in the ﬁelds owned by members of the
cooperative. SAV, the “Società Agricoltori Vallagarina”, located in Rovereto,
is a cooperative that transforms the grapes and sells the wine on behalf of
members. It is a relatively small cooperative, with about 700 members and 700
ha (around 1,730 acres) of vineyards, selling on average 10,000 T. of wine every
year, mostly Chardonnay (30%).
Since the late seventies, in an eﬀort to improve the quality of its members’
production, the cooperative has been investigating the diﬀerent vineyards of its
members, located at diﬀerent locations, trying to match each production zone
with the best varieties and agronomic practices. Indeed, using the information
obtained in these studies, the cooperative oﬀers consistent incentives and tech-
nical assistance to members to have their vineyards chosen and located in the
areas that are the most suitable. This is an instance of the more general idea of
terroir, that is the practice of taking advantage and highlighting the diﬀerences
and peculiarities of each area in order to transmit them into the wines, so that
every region may have its own speciﬁc wines, a relatively common practice in
the European system of appellation d’origine contrôllée (AOC).
The data available for this study were collected during three years, 1994,
1995 and 1996 for a white grape variety, Chardonnay, and a red grape variety,
Merlot.20 These are not the usual experimental data, in the sense that they
were not undertaken in the traditional experimental plots. Instead, the “exper-
iments” were performed in the vineyards of the members. A sample of members
was selected, and particular attention was given so to avoid those members
known for using “extreme” practices, for instance too much production per ha
or very high quality. Since the purpose of the experiments was to estimate the
eﬀects that the diﬀerent production areas have on grape production, all farm-
ers were provided with the standard technical assistance oﬀered to members,
and were hence suggested to follow the agronomic practices regarding labour,
fertilizer, pesticides, etc. that were deemed suitable for their varieties and zone.
Therefore, vineyards located in similar areas and cultivated with the same
variety were to be subject to the same agronomic practices regarding fertiliz-
ers, pesticides, labour, etc. Within every ﬁelds considered for the trials, the
researchers of the Istituto could choose the trees that were the subject of all
the measurement regarding pruning activities, production levels, grapes char-
acteristics, etc. In addition, the grapes obtained were collected, analyzed and
20Data is available also for other varieties, but the number of observations is much smaller.
18delivered to the cooperative, where they were paid like all other grapes, i.e.,
subject to the same remuneration scheme.
To summarize, members of the cooperative that participated in the experi-
mental study were implementing the agronomic practices suggested by the co-
operative’s agronomist, and responded to the economic incentives common to
all members. Indeed, their production was paid according to the schemes nor-
mally implemented by the cooperative for its members, which we describe in
the following section. Given the nature of the data, as we argue in the section
to follow, we ﬁnd most appropriate to use a dual approach estimating a revenue
f u n c t i o nb a s e do nm o d i ﬁed prices as we illustrate in the text. We now describe
the data used in the estimation.
4.3.1 The remuneration scheme
SAV, the wine cooperative for which data are available for this study, in 1991
started to implement a remuneration scheme that together with the weight of
grapes considered also sugar content, a scheme that is still in use today, even if
with a partial modiﬁcation.21 Grapes are thus paid according to quantity and
sugar content.
• Production per ha
The ﬁrst parameter considered in the payment of grapes is the production
per ha. Indeed, all cooperative members belong to an AOC area and thus
produce grapes for appellation wines. To be eligible for AOC status,22 however,
members need to produce at most a certain amount of grapes per ha, speciﬁc
for each variety and region. In the case of Merlot and Chardonnay, the two
varieties under consideration, the limit in Trentino is at 150 quintals/ha.23 In
other words, all the production that is obtained in ﬁelds where the unitary
yields is below 150 q/ha can be sold as AOC. If the production is above 150
q/ha, there is a downgrading of production. Indeed, if the excess production
is within a 20% tolerance, corresponding to 30 q/ha, then it is only partially
downgraded and awarded a (partially) lowered payment. However, if the total
production per hectare is above the ceiling plus the tolerance, i.e., above 180
q/ha, then it cannot be sold as AOC and gets a more substantive downgrading
and price reduction, since it can be sold only as table wine.
In the SAV cooperative, in particular, if the production of a member is within
the limit of 150 q/ha, the price paid per quintal of grapes is depending only on
its sugar content, as will be shown below. If production per ha, however, is
above this limit, the member incurs into a penalty. Indeed, if production y is
within the limit plus the 20% tolerance, that is if 150 <y≤ 180 q/ha, then the
quantity of grapes within the 150 q/ha limit is paid in full while the grapes above
21Before 1991, SAV used to pay only a ﬁxed price for unit of grapes.
22AOC wines usually obtain higher prices compared to non-AOC or so so called “table
wines”. These latter receive EU market support through the transformation to alcohol for
industrial use, i.e., distillation, either on a voluntary or compulsory basis.
23A quintal is 100 kilograms or 0.1 ton.
19the limit are paid only half the sugar-related price. Moreover, if the production
per ha is higher than the limit plus the tolerance, however, then the penalty is
higher: all the production is paid only half of the price based on sugar content.
To summarize, we have the following
Rij =

    
    
pj(sij)yij if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij)150 + (yij − 150)
pj(sij)
2 if 150 <y ij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij)yij
2 if yij > 180 q/ha,
(32)
where Rij is the revenue per ha of ﬁrm i for the delivery of the grapes of variety
j, pj(sij)=rij sij is the price received for unit of grapes, rij is the unit price
of sugar for the individual member, sij is the sugar content for the individual
member, and yij is the grapes production (weight) per ha.
• Sugar content
Regarding sugar content, the unit price, i.e., the Euro (Italian lira in 1994-
1996) per unit of sugar content (measured in degrees Babo), is a function of
sugar content delivered by a member compared to the average sugar content of
all the members of the cooperative. Indeed, after all grapes are collected and
transformed into wine, the cooperative computes the mean sugar content, call
it sj,w h i c hi ss p e c i ﬁc for each grape variety j. Each member production, i.e.,
her sugar content, is then compared to the cooperative mean, and receives a
premium if the sugar content is above the average, or a penalty if it is below the
average. More formally, the pricing scheme for sugar content can be summarized
with the following
rij = rj +( sij − sj)τj, (33)
where rij is the unit price of sugar for the individual member i for the grape
of variety j, rj is the unit price of sugar when grapes have a sugar content
equal to the mean of the cooperative, sij is the sugar content for the individual
member i for the grape of variety j, sj is the cooperative average sugar content
for grape j,a n dτj is the premium (penalty) for unit of content above (below)
the cooperative mean.
In table 1 we report the details of the remuneration scheme for Chardonnay
and Merlot over the diﬀerent years as established by the SAV’s Board of Direc-
tors. For example, in 1994 the mean sugar content for Merlot grapes delivered
by members to the cooperative was 17◦ Babo (column A).24 The payment for
grapes with such sugar content was 86,207 Italian Liras (column B), or 44.52
Euro (column C) per quintal of grapes, corresponding to rj =5 ,071 Liras per
degree Babo (column D). In case the sugar content of grapes was diﬀerent from
the mean, the premium (penalty) was 70 liras per tenth of degree Babo (or 700
liras per degree, column E).
24Both Babo and Brix degrees refer to the sugar content of grapes juice. 1 degree Babo is
equivalent to 0.85 degree Brix.
20For instance, if the sugar content of a member in 1994 for Merlot was 16.5◦
Babo, and hence below the cooperative mean, the amount received for each
degree Babo was reduced to rij =5 ,071 − (0.5 ∗ 700) = 4,721 liras per degree.
This would translate into a remuneration of 16.5◦ ∗ 4,271 = 77,896 liras (or
40.23 Euro) per quintal of grapes.
From table 1 it is possible to notice that SAV paid a premium for sugar
content above average and imposed a penalty for sugar content below average
in the period from 1991 until 1999. Starting from 2000, the scheme allowed only
for penalties, i.e., a discount for sugar content below average, and the premium
is not paid any longer.25
It is also important to notice that members of the cooperative know the
pricing mechanism in advance but at the time they make production decisions
- from the winter pruning up to the delivery of the grapes to the cooperative’s
premises - they in fact do not know exactly whether they will receive a bonus or
a penalty. Indeed, this aspect depends on how all members perform. In other
words, all members deliver diﬀerent lots of grapes to the cooperative; the coop-
erative evaluates all lots of all members; for each type of grapes the cooperative
ﬁnds the average sugar content and the economic value of the average sugar
content; for each lot/member, the penalty or premium is ﬁnally determined.
The time from harvest to the ﬁnal payment received by the member is about
one year, during which the cooperative produces the wines and sell them into
the market. During this time period the producers receive part of the total
sum that they are ﬁnally awarded for their grapes, which vary according to the
market price received by the cooperative.
4.3.2 Input and output data
Given the nature and the purpose of the trials, the data that are available
are mostly primal, i.e., in physical quantities. The price schedule explained
above allows the computation of the revenues per ha that each member received
given her production per ha and sugar content. However, no information is
available regarding input prices, and on the input quantities little information
can be gathered regarding agronomic practices such as the use of fertilizers,
pesticides, water, etc. Indeed, as already explained, the purpose of the trials
was to investigate the potential of diﬀerent locations-varieties combinations in
terms of yields and quality attributes. Therefore, on the input side, the data we
have available was intended to describe diﬀerent locations, and are the following
- altimetry,
- the number of vines per hectare, which is ﬁx e di nt h es h o r tr u ng i v e nt h a t
v i n e ss t a yp l a n t e df o rm a n yy e a r s ,
- the depth of the roots, a measure of the depth of usable soil, a categorical
variable going from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 3,
25According to the SAV agronomist, “... over the years members steadily increased sugar
content up to a level that the market could not remunerate it any more...”. Thus the decision
to allow for a constant unit price, i.e., not a premium any more, for sugar content at or above
the cooperative mean, but to give a discount for sugar content below the mean.
21- the water reservoir, a measure of the water holding capacity, in the range
1-4,
- total calcium, starting from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5,
- skeleton, a categorical variable (1-4) for the presence of rocks in the soil,
- internal drainage, a categorical variable from 1 (bad) to 5 (too much),
- external drainage, a categorical variable from 1 (slow) to 3 (a lot).
Only few variables were more “in the control of the producers”, and thus
represented some choices by them, such as
- the number of buds per branch, a result of the pruning intensity,
- irrigation, a dummy for the presence of irrigation,
- cultivated, a dummy for the presence of grass or cultivated land between
the vines.
Some descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in table 2A and
2B. Notice that for Chardonnay there are more observations: a total of 648
against 337 for Merlot over the three years.26 On average, Chardonnay trials
were conducted on higher ﬁelds compared to Merlot: the average height above
the sea level was around 260 meters against above 200 for Merlot. The number
of vines per hectare was higher for Chardonnay, around 3200, compared to 2700
for Merlot. This latter variety, however, presented more buds per branch over
the years. For the roots depth, water reservoir and total calcium, there were
not signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two varieties.
We also have data on weather conditions, but it is coming from a unique
meteoric station, and so we have only variation over the years. As it is stan-
dard practice among practitioners, we consider this data for the last 40 days
before harvest time. Since this latter is diﬀerent for the two varieties,27 we in
fact have diﬀerent data on weather conditions between the two varieties. The
information available for weather conditions are related to the humidity and the
temperature, measured as the average of the 40 days considered. In addition,
rainfall, radiation, hours of sun, and temperature excursions, are all considered
as the total summation over the last 40 days before harvest time (tables 2-A
and 2-B).
For Chardonnay, being the pre-harvest seasons anticipated 2-3 weeks in Sum-
mer time, they were on average hotter, with more radiation, hours of sun, and
higher temperature excursions. For Merlot, average humidity and rainfall were
higher in 1994 and 1995 compared to Chardonnay. The year 1994 was particu-
larly rich in rainfall for both varieties.
For the grapes obtained in the diﬀerent ﬁelds, we have information on
- production per hectare,
- sugar content (measured in degree Brix),
-t a r t a r i ca c i d ,
- malic acid,
26The number of observations changes among variables and across years because of missing
and incomplete data.
27On average, harvest time was the ﬁrst week of September for Chardonnay, and the third





Over the period 1994-1996, Merlot grapes show higher pH but less total, tar-
taric and malic acidity. Potassium content is higher in Merlot than Chardonnay
(tables 2-A and 2-B).
We pay a closer look at production and sugar content, since they are the two
most important aspects of grapes production for our empirical implementation
of the pricing scheme. Overall, Merlot is more productive in terms of both grapes
production and sugar content (ﬁgures 1 and 3). Considering the production per
hectare of grapes over the entire period, Merlot is statistically more productive
than Chardonnay (1% signiﬁcance level (s.l.)),28 but in 1995 there were no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two varieties (ﬁgure 1). The
year 1996 appears to have been the most productive year for both varieties
(ﬁgure 2), with Merlot reaching an average of 22 tones per hectare (up from 14
in 1995) and Chardonnay reaching 18 tones/ha (up from 13 in 1995).
Over the period 1994-1996 and for each year considered, Merlot has statis-
tically signiﬁcant more sugar than Chardonnay (ﬁgure 3), with a signiﬁcance
level of 1% (except in 1994, when s.l.=5%). Opposite to the case of production
per hectare seen above, however, 1996 is the year with the least sugar content
(ﬁgure 4 and tables 2-A/B). In other words, in 1996 the data show a very high
production of grapes but with lower sugar content: Merlot contains 19.8 degrees
Brix, down from an average of 20.5 in 1995, while for Chardonnay sugar content
in 1996 was 19.2◦ Brix, down from 19.9 in 1994.
As explained in the previous sections, we need to estimate a composite error
model where some variables x aﬀect the production possibilities while some
variables z aﬀect the technical eﬃciency. With this distinction in mind, we
partition the available data in the following fashion: y grapes production, s
sugar content in ◦ Brix, x1 the number of buds per branch, x2 total acidity, x3
pH, x4 tartaric acid, x5 malic acid, x6 potassium, z1 altimetry, z2 the number
of vines per hectare, z3 the water reservoir, and z4 total calcium.29
4.4 The endogeneity problem
Agronomic reasons suggest that, among the set of variables that are available
and can be used to estimate the production function in eq. (12), one needs
to pick the set of exogenous regressors that inﬂuence the yields, among these
the variables that could be endogenous, and thus a set of instruments for the
endogenous variables. It is reasonable to expect that s, the quality level, is
28The ﬁgures 1-4 show kernel estimates. To test the diﬀerences between cultivars or years
we performed the Mann-Withney test of equality of medians and the Kolmogoroﬀ-Smirnoﬀ
test of equality of distributions. Results of the tests are reported in the kernel ﬁgures. All
ﬁgures and tests were prepared using Stata 7/SE.
29Notice that we have information on the depth of the roots and scheleton as well, but these
two variables are actually related to the water holding capacity. Indeed, their correlation
coeﬃcients, both signiﬁcant, were 0.72 and -0.69 respectively. They hence were omitted to
limit collinearity problems and the number of parameters to be estimated.
23endogenous. It is quite well known among practitioners, even though to the
best of our knowledge not explicitly documented, that there might be a trade-oﬀ
between quality and quantity and that producers, when taking their production
decisions, may decide on the quantity and quality level simultaneously.
A possible instrument for the quality choice s is the lagged price that pro-
ducers received for the grapes. For this reason, we need to consider the prices
that producers face when making their producing decisions. In other words, we
need to take into account that the cooperative under consideration is actually
using a remuneration scheme which depends (already) on quality - sugar content
- but also on the production level.
To give explicit consideration to the remuneration schedule faced by the
producers member of the cooperative, we need to take into account that the
data generating process that underlies the information available for the estima-
tion is not the one for the usual competitive price taking behavior. In other
words, producers face a downward-sloping demand curve, i.e., a non-linear pric-
ing schedule, and thus we follow an intuition put forth by Diewert (1974) to
deal with non-competitive situations using duality theory.
In addition, we want to emphasize that the price discrimination along the
quantity dimension is not really a choice of the cooperative. In other words, the
cooperative is not using quantity restrictions as a way to exercise monopoly
power. This cooperative, like many others in the area, is operating under
the AOC system, with the quantity restrictions exogenously imposed on the
producers - and hence the cooperative - who want to sell their wine with the
appellation. Given the exogenous quantity restrictions, the cooperative tries
to maximize members’ welfare providing incentives for quality to capture con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for quality wines.30 In addition, we are considering
Merlot and Chardonnay, two varieties that are pretty common in many other
places in the world and so have plenty of substitutes.31
Moreover, to deal with the price being dependent on the quality level, and
to be consistent with the theoretical part of this study, we would use a re-
stricted revenue function where we represent the optimal quantity choice given
the quality choices of a representative member with the following
R(p(s,y),x,s,θ)=s u p
y
{p(s,y)y : y ∈ P(x,s,θ)}, (34)
= p(s,y∗)y∗,
where y∗ is the optimal choice for grapes production, and p(s,y) is the price
received for unit of grapes, which depends on s, the sugar content for the indi-
30In the discussions with the cooperatives’ management in Trentino, it emerged that their
interest is in devising an incentive scheme to pay for quality (not only sugar content). They
never mentioned or discussed the need for quantity restrictions or the like.
31Diﬀerent may be the case with local varieties, common in the Trentino region as well, but
which we not consider here. The choice of quantity restrictions by the AOC governing body,
however, could be seen as a way to restrict output, but we think this is a diﬀerent matter from
the one modeled in this study, in which the output restriction could be seen as an imperfect
way to obtain higher quality from producers.
24vidual member, and recognizes that in our empirical setting it is also depending
on y, the grapes production.
To deal with non-competitive situations using duality theory, Diewert (1974)
argues that when the output set is closed and convex and if the pricing schedule
is diﬀerentiable at y∗, the objective function in eq. (34) can be linearized with
respect to y around the observed production choice vector y∗. This linearized
version will be tangent to the production surface at y∗, i.e., it will be a support-
ing hyperplane to the convex output set when the producer is monopolistically
optimizing, or more speciﬁcally for our case, when facing a non-linear pricing
schedule. It is then possible to apply the well known duality results and employ
the usual econometric techniques. In other words, we have the following
sup
y
{e py: y ∈ P(x,s,θ)} ≡ e R(e p,x,s,θ), (35)
= e pR(1,x,s,θ),
where e p = p(s,y∗)+p0(s,y∗)y∗ is the marginal revenue32 of the producer for
her choice of output level, e R(e p,x,s,θ) is the producer’s true (restricted) revenue
function, and R(1,x,s,θ) is the producer’s (restricted) production function.
Notice that the second line of eq. (35) above comes from the linear homogeneity
in prices of the (restricted) revenue function.
The estimation of the restricted revenue function can proceed as usual, i.e.,
either estimate the revenue function or the revenue function together with the
supply equations derived by using Hotelling’s lemma, replacing the observed
price by the appropriate marginal prices (Diewert, 1982). In our case, the price
schedule that each member faces represents her demand schedule and hence it
is exogenous allowing the dual estimation of the revenue function.33
Referring to the price schedule facing each producer and represented in eq.
(32), notice that the pricing rule is not everywhere diﬀerentiable. We thus
consider piecewise diﬀerentiability and consider a pricing rule that is almost
everywhere diﬀerentiable. In particular, consider that only at y = 150 q/ha it
is not diﬀerentiable, but the right and left derivatives do exist.34 The marginal





pj(sij,y ij) if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij,yij)
2 if yij > 150 q/ha.
32Diewert (1974 and 1982) actually calls it the marginal price or shadow price of output.
33In suggesting this approach for a monopolist, Diewert noticed that from an empirical point
of view its drawback is that the slope of the demand curve facing the monopolist must be
known to the outside observers of the market. In our setting, however we have the knowledge
of the demand curve, i.e., the pricing schedule, that each ﬁrm is facing so that the appropriate
marginal prices can be calculated. To the best of our knowledge, this approach originally
suggested in Diewert (1974) has never been applied.
34However, in the actual dataset used for this study no observation was found at exactly
150 q/ha.
35See appendix 2 for the derivation.
25For the information on the prices pj(sij,y ij), one could assume that producers
have perfect foresight. Indeed, one could postulate that besides the “mechan-
ics” of the pricing scheme producers know also the mean sugar content for the
cooperative, sj, and the unit price of sugar for grapes with a mean sugar con-
tent, rj. In addition, it could be assumed that each member does not behave
strategically with respect to the group and that she cannot inﬂuence the group
mean.36
To conclude, to take into account the endogeneity problem of sugar content
one could instrument it using the lagged price. Indeed, if sjt is the optimal
choice of ﬁrm j at time t, a possible instrument could be e p(sjt−1,y jt−1),t h e
marginal price received by ﬁrm j at time t − 1 for producing quality sjt−1 and
production level yjt−1. One may argue that producers’ decisions are related to
prices they received the previous year, but which are predetermined.37 Using
this instrument it is possible to take into account the endogeneity problem using
the General Method on Moments with a composite error model (Olson, Schmidt,
and Waldman, 1980).
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Estimation and technical eﬃciency
We report ﬁrst the results of the ML estimation of the composite error model
in eq. (28) for the pooled data, i.e., for both cultivars and for the three years
considered (table 3A). Notice that quite few of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant,
including that on the sugar coeﬃcient which is negative and signiﬁcant at the
10% s.l. Two of the coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables for the ineﬃciency
term, the z’s, appear signiﬁc a n t . A tt h eb o t t o mo ft h et a b l ew er e p o r tt h e
estimates of the variance for both error components, σ2
v and σ2
u,w h i c hs h o w sa
clear predominance of the variability for the symmetric component σ2
v.
We also report the estimates of the technical ineﬃciency expressed in original
units, that is b ui calculated by eq. (30), in table 4. Notice that since we are using
the production data in the original units, i.e., not in log form, the values reported
are expressed in terms of reduced production. Thus the most ineﬃcient unit is
almost 32 quintals of grapes less eﬃcient than the frontier. To cast the results
on the technical ineﬃciency in terms more familiar for the reader, that is in
percentage form, we report also the estimates of eq. (31) in table 4. Notice that
the average eﬃciency is about 91%, with the most ineﬃcient producer being
only 75%-eﬃcient compared to the producers on the frontier.
36In models of moral hazard and relative performance, it is common to exclude the individual
performance from the computation of the mean to which she is benchmarked to (see, e.g.,
Bogetoft, 1995). Here we do not have all the observations that would be needed to compute
the group’s mean. In addition, notice that here we do not model a moral hazard problem.
37In fact, as we explained earlier, producers receive the ﬁnal payment of grapes delivered in
the year t − 1 to the cooperative at around the harvest time of year t. The possible problem
with this price, however, is that it could inﬂuence also the choice of production level.
26We calculate (and report) the values in original units since b θi = −b ui and
hence we can estimate the optimal quality choices in eq. (15), in particular
the second term in the right hand side. Indeed, we also report the results for
the estimation of the “correction factor”38 for the demand parameters, i.e., for
the ﬁrst part of the right hand side of eq. (15), and that takes into account the
production technology and producers’ heterogeneity. Notice that on average this
factor has a value of -15.4◦ Brix, going from a minimum of -15.9 to a maximum
of -14.9. Considering that on average the sugar content actually chosen by the
producers in the sample is about 20◦ Brix, it means that the correction factor
is about 75-80% of the actual choices, with a diﬀerence between the most and
the least eﬃcient producer of the order of 5-6%.
We estimate also the pooled data with dummies for the year and the
cultivar (second set of columns, table 3A). The dummies for both years and the
cultivar are indeed signiﬁcant. Notice also that some of the results are diﬀerent.
First of all, more explanatory variables, i.e., the x’s, are now signiﬁcant. Three
of the coeﬃcients on the z’s, the variables explaining the ineﬃciency, are now
negative and signiﬁcant. In addition, the symmetric component σ2
v is much
lower, while slightly higher appears the asymmetric one, σ2
u.
Of particular interest are the results on b ui,t h ei n e ﬃciency term in the origi-
nal units. The mean value is now higher, around 47 quintals, going from around
zero to almost 126 quintals. Thus taking into account the heterogeneity across
years and cultivars sensibly decreases the technical eﬃciency of the producers
under consideration. This translates into a slightly bigger correction factor in
eq. (15) - its average value is about -15.8◦ Brix - but more importantly with
more variability, going from -17.5 to -12.9 ◦ Brix (table 4). In terms of techni-
cal eﬃciency, this corresponds to about 83% of mean technical eﬃciency, going
from a minimum of 49% to 100% (table 4).
Comparing across the two speciﬁcations, with and without dummies, we can
indeed see the diﬀerences by looking at the distributions of the eﬃciency scores,
i.e., their kernels (see ﬁgure 5). The ﬁgure on the left shows the model with
no dummies for the years and cultivar, while the one on the right is estimated
with those dummies. As can be seen, the model without the dummies has a
distribution with a mode above 0.9 and it is not very dispersed. On the contrary,
the model with the dummies has a mode around 0.8 and it is more dispersed.
Moreover, notice that the eﬃciency score for Chardonnay39 appears bimodal
in both model speciﬁcations. In ﬁgure 6 we report the eﬃciency distribution
across years (again for both model speciﬁcations, with and without dummies).
As in the previous ﬁgure, the major diﬀerence is between the model with and















$ ,w h e r ee β is the estimated coeﬃcient and x is the
mean of the variable across observations.
39Notice that we estimate the pooled sample for both cultivars and all years, thus imposing
the same common technology frontier, but we actually show the results distinguishing for the
two diﬀerent cultivars (in ﬁgure 5) or the diﬀerent years (ﬁgure 6).
27without dummies, where in this latter the mean technical eﬃciency is higher
and less dispersed.
We perform the same analysis, that is estimating the technology and the
technical eﬃciency, after dividing the pooled data into the two cultivars, Chardon-
nay and Merlot. We report ﬁrst the results of Chardonnay, starting with the
model in eq. (21) - see table 3A, last columns - and then including also the dum-
mies for the years (table 3B, ﬁrst column). Although the data available allow
for more observations than Merlot, the estimation of the model for Chardonnay
appears more problematic. Indeed, when using the model without the dummies
for the years, convergence could not be obtained.40
However, when estimating the model Chardonnay with dummies for the
year, results appear quite similar to the pooled sample, even though fewer x’s
variables appear signiﬁcant. Among the z’s, vines density and water reservoir
appear negative and signiﬁcant. Technical eﬃciency results are quite similar to
the pooled sample with dummies model: rather low (on average 82%), leading to
a correction factor slightly bigger (-15.8) and more dispersed (from -17.7 to -11.9
◦ Brix). In ﬁgure 7 we report the distribution of the technical eﬃciency scores for
Chardonnay with both model speciﬁcations, with the already explained caveats
for the results of the model without dummies.
Considering Merlot, in the estimation without the dummies for the years,
none of the explanatory variables for the ineﬃciency term z’s are signiﬁcant
(table 3B). The ineﬃciency term in original units, b ui, is quite low (around 15.6
q), corresponding to an average technical eﬃciency of around 92%. However, the
correction factor is quite similar to the values already seen, that is an average
of -15.2 ◦ Brix, and with a limited range, going from -15.7 to -14.7 ◦ Brix (table
4).
When estimating Merlot with dummies for the years, fewer of the ex-
planatory variables x’s are signiﬁcant, even though the 1996 dummy is signif-
icant at the 5% level. Of the z’s variables aﬀecting the ineﬃciency term, only
the density of vines is signiﬁcant and negative (table 3B). The ineﬃciency is
now larger, reaching an average of 23.4 quintals of grapes, corresponding to a
mean technical eﬃciency of about 89%. The correction factor is slightly bigger,
about -15.6 ◦ Brix, going from -16.32 to -14.9 ◦ Brix. In ﬁgure 8 we report the
technical eﬃciency score distributions for Merlot across the years and for the
two model speciﬁcations. The distributions appear rather similar between the
two speciﬁcations, with 1996 having the highest eﬃciency and 1995 the lowest.
5.2 The optimal quality choices
In this section we report the results of the simulation for the optimal quality
choice, that is s(θ) of eq. (15). For this simulation we need an estimate of the
40It appears that the Hessian matrix is singular and thus not invertible impeding the clas-
sical Newton-Raphson optimization algorithm to ﬁnd a solution to the maximum likelihood
problem. To derive the standard errors a generalized inverse (produced by dropping one or
more rows/columns) is used instead for the variance covariance matrix. This explains why
the standard errors for the z’s variables for Chardonnay are missing (table 3A, last column).
28demand parameters a and b. To make the simulated quality choices comparable
to the choices actually made by the producers in the SAV cooperative from
which the data were originated,41 for the value of b we use the value of sugar
(euro per degree Brix) that was associated with the average content for the
speciﬁc year and cultivar, as can be inferred from table 1 discussed earlier.42
Using the pricing scheme actually imple m e n t e dw eo b t a i na l s os o m es t a r t i n g
values for a needed to calibrate the simulation.43
We report the diﬀerent cases for the parameters a and b in table 5. For each
variety, we take the values of a and b that can be inferred from the payments
made by the SAV cooperative (table 1) in those years. We calculate the average
across years of the parameter - either a or b - and then create two other diﬀerent
values for each parameter by adding and subtracting 50%.44 In this fashion we
can construct 3x3=9 cases, reported in table 5. We thus report the 9 diﬀerent
cases resulting from the diﬀerent combinations of the values for parameters a
and b. We also report the same cases for the pooled data sample, where we
take the average of Chardonnay and Merlot mean parameter values and then
add/subtract 50%. Notice that for all samples, case 5 has exactly the parameter
values that can be inferred from table 1 (actually the mean across years).
In tables 6A and 6B we report the results for the quality choices, comparing
the actual choices and those simulated with the 9 cases explained above, again
distinguishing for the pooled, Chardonnay and Merlot samples. In all samples,
we can notice similar results. First of all, in almost all instances the average
value of the simulated optimal choices of sugar is higher than the actual choices.
In case 5, when the parameter values for a and b are similar to those obtained
from the payments made by the cooperative, the simulated quality choices are
somewhat around 50% higher than the actual choices. The closest simulation to
41Notice also that even if useful for comparison purposes, this is just an approximation. The
average sugar value obtained in this fashion indeed is calculated from the total revenues for
the wines produced (for each variety) minus the costs born by the cooperative to transform the
grapes and selling the wines, divided by the total sugar content produced by all members. We
also refer here only to a subset of the members, those for which valid experimental production
data is available.
42In table 1 in fact the values refer to degrees Babo. The b value obtained in this fashion is
3.05, 4.79 and 4.91 Euro/degree Babo for Chardonnay respectively for 1994, 1995, 1996; and
2.62, 3.51 and 4.75 for Merlot in the same years. Similar values were obtained in a hedonic
study of red grapes in the nearby province of Verona. Perali (1996) estimates the marginal
price for the quality charactersitics of the grapes (Corvina, Rondinella and Molinara) used for
Bardolino, a red wine produced in Verona that is usually is not aged but drank quite young.
Using data for the period 1983-1993, he reports that the marginal price for sugar content was
about 2.65 Euro per ◦ Babo at 1993 constant prices.
43Given the sugar content of grapes and the pricing scheme of the SAV cooperative, we
calculate the unit price of the grapes as a function of sugar content. We then calculate the
vertical intercept by interpolation to ﬁnd an estimate of a. W eo b t a i nv a l u e si nt h er a n g e
a ∈ [−128,−94]: for Chardonnay, -102, -121 and -122 respectively in 1994, 1995 and 1996; for
Merlot, -105, -94 and -128 in the same years.
44For instance, the average value of a across years for Chardonnay is a = −115 and so we
obtain:
a1 = −(115 ∗ 50%) = −58;
a2 = a = −115;
a3 = −(115 ∗ 150%) = −173.
29the actual choices is the one with the parameters of case 9, where the average of
the optimal quality choices is around that of the actual choices. This is a result
common to all samples and model speciﬁcations.
In addition, in all cases the simulated quality has lower variability than the
actual quality choices. This is an expected result, since in the simulation we
“take away” the variability coming from the symmetric error component σ2
v,
while we are left only with the asymmetric component σ2
u via the estimate of
the technical eﬃciency, b θ, that enters the correction factor in eq. (15).
A clearer picture of the results can be formed by looking at the distribution
of the actual and simulated quality choices. In ﬁgures 9-10-11 we report the
kernel estimates of the distributions for the actual choices, those of case 5 (with
parameter values similar to those inferred from the actual payments to the
producers), those of case 9 (with sugar level similar to the actual choices), and
those of case 1.
In the pooled and Chardonnay samples we can observe that the distributions
of the simulated choices with the speciﬁcation without dummies are much less
dispersed than those of the actual choices, while in the model with the dummies
the distributions have quite the same dispersion. Notice also that the distribu-
tions of case 9 are quite overlapping with those of the actual choices. In the case
of Merlot, on the other hand, both model speciﬁcations lead to the simulated
choices distribution that are considerably less dispersed than those of the actual
choices.
Summarizing, the optimal quality choices derived in the theoretical and em-
pirical part of the paper - although quite sensitive to the choice of the de-
mand parameters used to calibrate the simulation - appear higher and often
less variable across producers than the choices actually made. Using the de-
mand parameters that can be inferred from the pricing scheme used by the SAV
cooperative actually leads to simulated choices that are on average 50% higher
than the actual choices. On the other hand, to obtain quality levels comparable
to the actual ones, one needs to start from an inverse demand for quality that
shows higher willingness to pay for quality (case 9).
Although this result might be related to a wrong calibration of the sim-
ulation,45 notice that over the period under consideration (from 1991, when
the pricing scheme for sugar was introduced, to 2003, the last year for which
data is available) the average sugar content in the cooperative in fact increased
quite consistently over time, as can be seen from table 1. This may show that
the cooperative wanted to increase the sugar content provided by the members
and to obtain it they might have decided to pay a price higher than the mar-
ket to set producers’ deliveries to a higher quality equilibria. In other words,
the cooperative may have induced farmers to produce grapes with more sugar
content using higher than the market prices for a transition period. Indeed,
as we will see shortly, the cooperative lowered the premium for above average
45As explained earlier, there could some selection bias in the use of only the subsample
of members for which production data is available. Or simply the way we infer the demand
parameters a and b from the actual payments made by the cooperative could be just imprecise.
30quality starting in 2000, presumably when it reached some sort of steady state
equilibrium more in line with market demand conditions.
5.3 The pricing scheme
In this section we report the results of the optimal pricing rule obtained by
eq. (17)46. We obtain results that appear quite symmetrical to those obtained
for the optimal quality choices. Indeed, with almost no exceptions, we obtain
price levels that are lower that those received with the actual mechanisms im-
plemented by the SAV cooperative (table 7A and 7B). In particular, in case 5
(where the demand parameter values appear closer to those inferred from ta-
ble 1 of the payments made by the cooperative), the average price received for
quintal of grapes would be 10% or less than the actual price received. To obtain
prices that are comparable to those actually obtained we need to consider case
9, which again would be consistent with a more optimistic evaluation of the
demand for quality and hence consumers’ willingness to pay for sugar content
(or alcohol content, for that matter).
For a better understanding of the results, we plot the pricing schemes - the
actual and the simulated ones - as a function of sugar content (ﬁgures 12-13-
14). The comparison with the actual pricing rule used in the SAV cooperative is
indeed quite interesting, showing that the pricing scheme derived in this study
using the same demand parameters (case 5) indeed results quite diﬀerent from
the one adopted by the cooperative. Notice in particular that in the actual
pricing mechanism the level of prices paid by the cooperative is much higher
than that emerging from the simulation using similar demand parameters. This
result is quite common in all samples and model speciﬁcations, even though it
is easier to see in the model with dummies where the dispersion is greater.
Paying higher prices is equivalent to having an enhanced slope of the pricing
schedule, and a steeper pricing schedule has more “incentive power”, in the
sense that paying a higher unit price for sugar induces higher sugar production
by members. As we explained in the previous section, this may be due to the
poor demand information we based our simulation upon. Or it could signal that
to increase the quality delivery of members the cooperative initially oﬀered a
relatively high price for sugar.
Indeed, starting from the year 2000, the cooperative under consideration
reduced the prices for sugar, in particular deciding that only the penalty for
sugar content below the group’s average was to be enforced, while the premium
for above average sugar production was not paid any longer. This may mean
that the actual pricing schedule implemented in 1994-1996 was in fact too steep,
i.e., too high, for the market demand and thus the actual willingness to pay for
sugar, i.e., alcohol content.47 On the other hand, the fact that the “penalty”
part of the pricing scheme is still enforced may be due to the requirements - in
46Th same results would be obtained using eq. (18).
47Another possible explanation is that the market demand may have changed in the mean-
time.
31the form of the minimum quality standard in terms of sugar content - needed
in order to qualify as AOC grapes.
As a last piece of evidence regarding the pricing scheme, we report its re-
lationship with the technical eﬃciency scores (ﬁgure 15). As can be seen, the
simulated price paid (case 9) appears increasing with the eﬃciency level,48 es-
pecially in the model with the dummies. On the other hand, the actual price
paid is decreasing with the eﬃciency level.49
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this study we derive the optimal quality choices and the pricing mechanism
for quality for a group of producers and we implement them empirically. First,
we derive the theoretical pricing scheme using a simple model for a group of
producers that needs to decide on how to pay for quality, i.e., sugar, in grapes
production. We ﬁnd that the optimal quality choices depend on the eﬃciency
level of farmers and on the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. In addition,
the optimal pricing scheme simply “reﬂects” market demand willingness to pay
for quality. Being the pricing scheme dependent on technology parameters, we
then estimate the production technology using a stochastic production frontier
that takes into account producers’ heterogeneity. We then simulate the opti-
mal quality choices and pricing schedule, and compare them to those actually
made by a group of producers for which we are able to estimate the production
technology.
A critical piece of information needed for the implementation of the theoret-
ical pricing scheme is the estimation of the technology. In this study we use a
primal approach, i.e., a restricted production function estimation based on a sto-
chastic production frontier and thus an error composite model, because we can
rely on quasi-experimental data for which input prices are not available. This
approach, however, may suﬀer from endogeneity problems. Given data avail-
ability, dual approaches - either based on proﬁt or revenue function estimation
- could be implemented, probably attenuating the endogeneity problem.
Another important piece of information, needed for actually implementing
the optimal contract, is the estimation of market demand for the quality at-
tributes of the product or commodity under consideration. In this study we
consider grapes for wine production and we infer some market demand infor-
mation from payments actually made by the cooperative under investigation.
Although this information may not be the ideal one for empirical implemen-
tation purposes, we are able to derive a pricing scheme and show that in fact
t h ec o o p e r a t i v es e e m st ob ep a y i n gt h es u g a rc o n t e n tm o r et h a nw h a tw ec a n
predict from the market information we have available. This diﬀerence may be
due to the poor market demand data we use, or may be related to some missing
48This is because the simulated quality choices are increasing with the eﬃciency level. This
result is not reported here but available on request.
49For clarity’s purposes we do not show all the observations for the actual choices but only
their linear regression ﬁt.
32aspects of the analysis.
Indeed, the paper makes some simplifying assumptions. We do not assume
any informational asymmetry between the group’s management and producers.
T h i sm a yb er e a l i s t i ci ns o m es e t t i n g s ,w h ile in others it may be questionable.
In addition, the actual pricing mechanism observed for the set of producers
analyzed in this study is a relative performance scheme in which each individual
producer is given a premium (penalty) if she is producing more (less) sugar than
the group’s average. Relative performance schemes are usually explained as a
mechanism to transfer the common risk from producers when there are problems
of hidden action, an informational asymmetry which is not modeled here but
that could be quite relevant in many settings given also the uncertainty due to
changing weather conditions.
The paper also does not model the group’s aversion for inequality or the
concern that each and every member may need to obtain a certain minimum
return from her grapes. It can be argued that diﬀerent pricing mechanisms can
have rather diﬀerent distributional impacts, and to the extent that cooperatives
and other producer groups may have some concern for equity in addition to
eﬃciency, this could be quite an important aspect that could explain the actual
remuneration choices with diﬀerent incentive power used by cooperatives and
producer’s groups.
It is reasonable to expect that the higher is the “power” of the pricing sched-
u l e ,t h eg r e a t e ri st h ei n e q u a l i t ya m o n gt h em e m b e r so ft h eg r o u pi nt e r m so f
price received per unit of grapes. In other words, the pricing mechanism should
serve to increase eﬃciency, i.e., to reﬂect market demand and enhance produc-
tion from more eﬃcient producers, but it has also an impact on the income
distribution across the members of the producers’ group. To the extent that
greater eﬃciency may imply greater inequality in returns to members, an in-
equality averse group may choose a less powerful pricing scheme. In the paper
we just mention some of these implications of diﬀerent pricing schemes, but we
believe that this topic deserves a much more thorough investigation.
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8.1 Appendix 1
A survey among the wine-cooperatives in the North-East of Italy was conducted
in 1998-99. Among other things, the cooperatives were asked about the rela-
tive importance given to the possible objectives pursued by their management.
We report here the results in decreasing order of importance. For each possible
answer, the interviewed person in the cooperative (either the CEO or the Chair-
man of the Board of Directors), could give a ranking from 1 (low importance)
to 7 (very important). Here are the results.
Objective Mean St. dev. Min Max # max
n=65
Equal treatment for all 6.8 0.5 2 7 53
Sure market outlet 6.3 1.7 1 7 51
Income/price enhancement 5.8 1.6 1 7 34
Quality enhancement 5.5 1 1 7 30
Management professionality 5.2 1.7 1 7 17
Local development 5.1 1.6 1 7 10
Cooperative values 4.9 1.6 1 7 11
Treatment based on quality 4.4 2.5 1 7 26
Price stabilization 4 1.8 1 7 2
Services to members 3.9 1.8 1 7 6
Increase bargaining power 3.8 2.1 1 7 4
Feeling of ownership 3.7 1.9 1 7 7
Members’ training 3.6 2.1 1 7 4
Members’ involvement 3.4 1.6 1 7 2
Members’ social networking 3.3 1.9 1 7 4
Members’ cost savings 2.3 1.8 1 7 3
The most important objective for the cooperatives interviewed is the fact
that members should be treated equally, probably a response which could be
motivated by the management’s fear of being accused of discriminating among
members. This answer obtains a score of 6.8 out of 7, and 53 cooperatives out
of 65 indicated it with the highest mark of importance. The second objective
indicated is for the cooperative to represent a secure market outlet for members’
supply. It receives an average score of 6.3, and 51 cooperatives out of 65 give
the maximum importance. The objective of price and income enhancement is
seen very important by 34 out 65 cooperatives and its average score is 5.8. The
quality enhancement of members’ products is on average getting a score of 5.5,
receiving the highest importance from 30 cooperatives.
8.2 Appendix 2
Starting from equation (32) we can derive the expression for the marginal price
e p = p(s,y∗)+p0(s,y∗)y by noting the following
36pij =

     
     




yij if 150 <y ij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij,yij)





     
     
0 if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
−75 pj(sij,yij)
y2
ij if 150 <y ij ≤ 180 q/ha,




    
    
pj(sij,y ij) if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij,yij)
2 if 150 <y ij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij,yij)
2 if yij > 180 q/ha.
37Table 1. Pricing schedule for sugar content, SAV
Type Premium
Year Degree Degree £./q €./q £./ °B £./G° +/-
A BC D E
1991 Babo 16.50 73,079 37.74 4,429  +/- 70
1992 Babo 16.00 56,304 29.08 3,519  +/- 70
1993 Babo 16.00 48,240 24.91 3,015  +/- 50
1994 Babo 17.00 86,207 44.52 5,071  +/- 70
1995 Babo 17.40 153,294 79.17 6,800  +/- 70
1996 Babo 17.00 156,400 80.77 9,200  +/- 90
1997 Babo 17.10 178,883 92.39 10,461  +/- 120
1998 Babo 17.40 162,180 83.76 9,321  +/- 120
1999 Babo 18.00 216,810 111.97 12,045  +/-200
2000 Brix 21.50 235,010 121.37 10,931 -200
€. €./G° +/-
2001 Brix 21.00 229,196 118.37 5.64 -0.100
2002 Brix 20.50 226,563 117.01 5.708 -0.105
2003 Brix 22.70 199,455 103.01 4.538 -0.130
Type Premium
Year Degree Degree £./q €./q £./ °B £./G° +/-
A BC D E
1991 Babo 16.70 128,306 66.26 7,683  +/- 90
1992 Babo 16.00 75,392 38.94 4,712  +/- 70
1993 Babo 16.50 57,503 29.70 3,485  +/- 50
1994 Babo 17.50 103,513 53.46 5,915  +/- 70
1995 Babo 17.20 159,616 82.43 9,280  +/- 90
1996 Babo 16.50 156,750 80.95 9,500  +/- 90
1997 Babo 16.90 168,476 87.01 9,969  +/- 120
1998 Babo 17.40 145,800 75.30 8,379  +/- 120
1999 Babo 18.00 188,100 97.15 10,450  +/- 200
2000 Brix 21.50 202,210 104.43 9,405 -150
€. €./G° +/-
2001 Brix 21.50 245,916 127.00 5.91 -0.080
2002 Brix 20.50 242,131 125.05 6.10 -0.085
2003 Brix 21.90 222,707 115.02 5.252 -0.080
MERLOT A.O.C.
CHARDONNAY A.O.C.Table 2-A. Inputs and Outputs - CHARDONNAY
Unit of 1994 1995 1996
Variable  measure n Mean St. dev. Min Max n Mean St. dev. Min Max n Mean St. dev. Min Max
Altimetry (z1) mt. 236 262.691 94.899 170 500 187 259.037 90.614 180 500 213 260.282 91.2022 180 500
Vines per hectare (z2) no. 236 3146.74 774.709 1500 5000 187 3193.69 789.8 1500 5000 213 3175.78 778.318 1500 5000
Buds per branch (x1) no. 236 23.6186 6.73943 10 42 187 27.016 8.5857 9 62 213 31.216 11.0769 8 89
Roots depth° 1-3 236 2.41525 0.85379 1 3 187 2.31016 0.8921 1 3 213 2.40845 0.85082 1 3
Water holding capacity° (z3) 1-4 236 2.29661 1.02155 1 4 187 2.18182 1.0102 1 4 213 2.29578 1.0149 1 4
Total calcium° (z4) 1-5 236 3.3517 1.13702 1 5 187 3.44385 1.1643 1 5 213 3.3662 1.14397 1 5
Scheleton° 1-4 236 2.62288 0.87868 1 4 187 2.6738 0.8893 1 4 213 2.6338 0.86176 1 4
Internal Drainage° 1-5 236 3.5678 0.92234 1 5 187 3.6631 0.8544 1 5 213 3.57747 0.86867 1 5
External Drainage° 1-3 236 2.76271 0.50828 1 3 187 2.78075 0.4864 1 3 213 2.77465 0.48166 1 3
Irrigated° 0-1 236 0.69915 0.4596 0 1 187 0.70053 0.4593 0 1 213 0.69014 0.46352 0 1
Cultivated° 0-1 236 0.03814 0.19193 0 1 187 0.04813 0.2146 0 1 213 0.04225 0.20164 0 1
Grapes production per ha 0.1 t./ha 236 146.575 60.1179 32 356.7 187 134.017 57.001 14.8 362.1 213 182.048 73.6158 40 451
Sugar content (s) °Brix 236 19.8953 1.36064 15.7 25.4 187 19.5631 1.3703 13.2 22.8 213 19.2305 1.01501 16.2 21.7
Total acidity (x2) gr./l. 236 8.54907 1.65822 5.6 16.07 187 10.5664 1.8004 6.75 15.54 213 11.868 1.4524 8.4 16.98
pH (x3) 1-14 236 3.15936 0.13824 2.81 3.65 187 3.17316 0.1081 2.89 3.44 213 3.20653 0.12002 2.9 3.63
Tartaric acidity (x4) gr./l. 214 6.52911 0.80975 3.62 8.88 187 7.86604 0.8516 5.91 10.01 213 7.09977 0.55282 5.62 9.02
Malic acidity (x5) gr./l. 214 3.96332 1.50448 0.86 9.5 187 5.64155 1.5179 2.65 9.99 213 5.73709 1.05352 3.36 8.07
Potassium content (x6) gr./l. 214 1.4779 0.19796 0.78 2.34 187 1.62155 0.2116 1.02 2.26 213 1.69648 0.17594 1.15 2.04
Mean humidity* % - 58.0 - - - - 62.0 - - - - 67.4 - - -
Mean temperature* °C - 22.6 - - - - 20.1 - - - - 19.7 - - -
Rainfall** mm. - 172.2 - - - - 61.7 - - - - 124.6 - - -
Radiation** cal./sqcm. - 14045.0 - - - - 11824.0 - - - - 10927.0 - - -
Sun hours** no. - 321.7 - - - - 266.4 - - - - 253.7 - - -
Temperature excursion** °C - 593.4 - - - - 534.3 - - - - 509.9 - - -
° Categorical variable
* Average conditions for the last 40 days before harvest
** Summation for the last 40 days before harvestTable 2-B. Inputs and Outputs - MERLOT
Unit of 1994 1995 1996
Variable  measure n Mean St. dev. Min Max n Mean St. dev. Min Max n Mean St. dev. Min Max
Altimetry (z1) mt. 81 209.7531 65.1148 180 450 129 203.488 53.5118 180 450 120 203.25 55.0655 180 450
Vines per hectare (z2) no. 81 2727.778 703.207 1500 4100 129 2701.16 644.855 1800 4100 120 2650 621.465 1800 4100
Buds per branch (x1) no. 81 30.01235 8.48601 7 58 129 28.8527 9.54193 12 61 120 37.6 14.4347 16 97
Roots depth° 1-3 81 2.320988 0.9464 1 3 129 2.51163 0.82079 1 3 120 2.525 0.80922 1 3
Water holding capacity° (z3) 1-4 81 2.481481 1.22588 1 4 129 2.74419 1.12694 1 4 120 2.775 1.11115 1 4
Total calcium° (z4) 1-5 81 3.345679 1.37077 1 5 129 3.51163 1.23185 1 5 120 3.425 1.28771 1 5
Scheleton° 1-4 81 2.283951 1.0516 1 4 129 2.32558 1.00904 1 4 120 2.275 1.02869 1 4
Internal Drainage° 1-5 81 3.333333 1.04881 1 5 129 3.23256 1.05706 1 5 120 3.175 1.02623 1 5
External Drainage° 1-3 81 2.567901 0.56873 1 3 129 2.55814 0.58506 1 3 120 2.55 0.59196 1 3
Irrigated° 0-1 81 0.493827 0.50308 0 1 129 0.53488 0.50073 0 1 120 0.5 0.5021 0 1
Cultivated° 0-1 81 0.111111 0.31623 0 1 129 0.06977 0.25575 0 1 120 0.05 0.21886 0 1
Grapes production per ha 0.1 t./ha 81 158.3259 63.5073 48.6 345 129 140.542 64.8205 11 364.9 120 220.678 83.6854 44 522.9
Sugar content (s) °Brix 81 20.15309 1.46791 17 24.6 129 20.4868 1.67777 13.5 23.9 120 19.8208 1.28108 16.3 22.5
Total acidity (x2) gr./l. 81 6.331235 1.53496 4.29 11.91 129 9.59643 2.45448 4.95 17.74 120 8.72508 1.03875 6.49 14.37
pH (x3) 1-14 81 3.584074 0.18372 3.05 3.95 129 3.35 0.13976 3.13 3.89 120 3.45225 0.47033 3.15 8.4
Tartaric acidity (x4) gr./l. 78 6.393333 1.00574 4.27 9.93 127 7.33811 0.92698 3.71 9.78 120 5.41617 0.69614 2.77 7.21
Malic acidity (x5) gr./l. 78 2.800128 1.22178 1.2 6.36 127 3.9215 1.11098 1.67 8.02 120 3.68808 0.69927 2.07 6.88
Potassium content (x6) gr./l. 78 1.784231 0.24385 1.06 2.51 128 1.73242 0.17144 1.15 2.26 120 1.9225 0.1572 1.5 2.34
Mean humidity* % - 63.0 - - - - 68.5 - - - - 65.5 - - -
Mean temperature* °C - 20.7 - - - - 17.6 - - - - 17.1 - - -
Rainfall** mm. - 274.9 - - - - 89.2 - - - - 83.0 - - -
Radiation** cal./sqcm. - 12349.0 - - - - 9439.0 - - - - 9470.0 - - -
Sun hours** no. - 281.7 - - - - 214.9 - - - - 220.0 - - -
Temperature excursion** °C - 549.2 - - - - 477.0 - - - - 504.9 - - -
° Categorical variable
* Average conditions for the last 40 days before harvest
** Summation for the last 40 days before harvestTable 3A. Estimation results of stochastic frontier
Sample -> Pooled data Pooled + dummies Chardonnay
Variable Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z|
Buds per branch (x1) 3.88 0.54 10.36 0.07 -10.15 0.26
Total acidity (x2) -94.03 0.08 -95.57 0.04 38.63 0.64
pH (x3) -551.08 0.15 -638.92 0.06 325.67 0.73
Tartaric acidity (x4) -83.34 0.31 -96.35 0.19 119.21 0.42
Malic acidity (x5) 61.79 0.42 73.99 0.29 -49.15 0.70
Potassium content (x6) 534.41 0.09 230.49 0.40 197.15 0.67
x1x1 0.01 0.47 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.45
x2x2 0.52 0.77 1.84 0.25 -2.36 0.37
x3x3 12.73 0.49 8.86 0.59 -96.76 0.73
x4x4 -8.80 0.01 -8.19 0.01 -20.36 0.00
x5x5 -4.06 0.20 4.27 0.14 -5.21 0.28
x6x6 39.75 0.55 22.90 0.69 -2.50 0.98
x1x2 -0.02 0.95 -0.34 0.33 0.69 0.21
x1x3 3.18 0.39 -0.16 0.96 12.94 0.02
x1x4 -0.66 0.16 -0.19 0.64 -1.79 0.03
x1x5 -0.03 0.95 0.17 0.71 1.00 0.18
x1x6 -1.82 0.50 -0.91 0.70 -13.85 0.00
x2x3 52.58 0.07 54.20 0.03 -4.70 0.92
x2x4 0.72 0.85 5.11 0.12 -7.80 0.20
x2x5 0.14 0.97 -9.27 0.01 3.30 0.60
x2x6 -13.02 0.53 7.64 0.67 2.53 0.93
x3x4 55.36 0.20 31.11 0.41 -44.78 0.60
x3x5 -57.57 0.23 -56.80 0.18 -26.99 0.71
x3x6 -152.16 0.27 -67.97 0.58 -72.98 0.78
x4x5 13.64 0.01 9.49 0.04 22.53 0.01
x4x6 -55.27 0.06 -29.45 0.25 6.41 0.89
x5x6 2.11 0.94 -10.42 0.69 8.31 0.84
x1s -0.14 0.44 -0.11 0.50 0.12 0.65
x2s 0.54 0.66 -0.88 0.41 0.13 0.95
x3s 14.76 0.34 20.57 0.13 9.34 0.68
x4s 3.21 0.08 4.03 0.01 4.46 0.10
x5s 0.05 0.98 1.07 0.50 0.14 0.96
x6s -3.82 0.70 -2.90 0.74 0.05 1.00




Constant 2073.11 0.07 2664.05 0.01 8.19 1.00
Altimetry (z1) 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.69 0.03    .
Vines per hectare (z2) -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00    .
Water holding capacity (z3) 4.71 0.04 -6.51 0.00 -0.07    .
Total calcium (z4) 2.34 0.24 -5.14 0.01 -0.07    .
Constant 15.37 0.52 220.35 0.00 1.03    .
sigma_u2 0.00 1.74 0.00
sigma_v2 3384.38 2566.59 3158.65Table 3B. Estimation results of stochastic frontier (cont.ed)
Sample -> Chardonnay + dummies Merlot Merlot + dummies
Variable Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z|
Buds per branch (x1) 7.29 0.34 26.03 0.06 22.73 0.10
Total acidity (x2) 88.96 0.20 -73.91 0.49 -156.22 0.15
pH (x3) 1075.48 0.18 -732.94 0.38 -956.06 0.23
Tartaric acidity (x4) 10.91 0.93 -227.64 0.12 -178.39 0.22
Malic acidity (x5) -114.12 0.27 172.14 0.37 224.17 0.23
Potassium content (x6) 194.92 0.61 30.63 0.97 -190.05 0.80
x1x1 -0.02 0.31 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.07
x2x2 -2.65 0.22 -1.89 0.51 1.41 0.64
x3x3 -290.16 0.21 35.76 0.21 5.27 0.86
x4x4 -15.61 0.00 -2.73 0.55 -2.15 0.63
x5x5 -0.82 0.84 -13.99 0.11 -7.06 0.43
x6x6 45.80 0.53 -29.73 0.80 -68.67 0.55
x1x2 -0.29 0.53 -0.62 0.35 -0.55 0.40
x1x3 6.23 0.17 -11.04 0.13 -9.49 0.18
x1x4 -1.49 0.03 1.10 0.09 0.98 0.13
x1x5 0.78 0.20 -0.66 0.47 -0.57 0.53
x1x6 -7.38 0.02 9.06 0.05 8.40 0.06
x2x3 -0.92 0.98 13.46 0.80 45.51 0.39
x2x4 -2.13 0.67 8.53 0.14 7.66 0.18
x2x5 0.83 0.88 1.65 0.82 -5.07 0.50
x2x6 -0.58 0.98 27.83 0.46 26.93 0.46
x3x4 -1.03 0.99 101.34 0.13 59.54 0.38
x3x5 -6.16 0.92 -21.57 0.83 -65.50 0.51
x3x6 -175.10 0.42 61.98 0.85 220.57 0.50
x4x5 16.21 0.02 11.24 0.17 11.53 0.15
x4x6 -12.37 0.75 -94.18 0.02 -57.55 0.17
x5x6 6.86 0.84 -41.56 0.41 -40.58 0.41
x1s -0.05 0.80 -0.49 0.07 -0.42 0.12
x2s -3.05 0.07 0.82 0.69 1.38 0.49
x3s -3.37 0.86 14.15 0.62 27.42 0.32
x4s 4.96 0.03 3.62 0.22 3.51 0.23
x5s 2.98 0.19 -4.36 0.21 -3.07 0.37
x6s 6.01 0.59 3.62 0.84 -2.07 0.91
Sugar content (s) -29.55 0.61 -70.19 0.46 -115.63 0.22
1995 -24.13 0.00 -0.07 1.00
1996 13.34 0.11 35.35 0.03
Chardonnay
Constant -1551.26 0.37 2759.97 0.35 3892.24 0.17
Altimetry (z1) 0.03 0.38 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.36
Vines per hectare (z2) -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.02
Water holding capacity (z3) -4.34 0.07 3.79 0.34 0.63 0.87
Total calcium (z4) -1.12 0.59 1.61 0.62 -0.63 0.85
Constant 240.20 0.00 1.46 0.97 52.10 0.14
sigma_u2 1.99 0.01         0.00
sigma_v2 2107.73 3163.94 3003.11Table 4. Technical efficiency results and correction factors
Sample Variable Unit of # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
measure
Pooled ui q 927 16.15 7.80 1.96 31.42
TEi % 927 0.91 0.04 0.75 0.99
Corr. Factor ° Brix 927 -15.43 0.28 -15.94 -14.88
Pooled with dummies
ui q 939 46.61 33.14 0.06 125.64
TEi % 939 0.83 0.10 0.49 1.00
Corr. Factor ° Brix 939 -15.79 1.22 -17.51 -12.87
Chardonnay
ui q 473 2.62 1.88 0.00 8.42
TEi % 473 0.98 0.06 -0.26 1.00
Corr. Factor ° Brix 473 -15.01 0.06 -15.10 -14.81
Chardonnay with dummies
ui q 614 50.23 39.32 0.07 149.83
TEi % 614 0.82 0.11 0.51 1.00
Corr. Factor ° Brix 614 -15.80 1.53 -17.74 -11.93
Merlot
ui q 313 15.61 6.66 0.32 31.21
TEi % 313 0.92 0.04 0.73 1.00
Corr. Factor ° Brix 313 -15.20 0.21 -15.68 -14.72
Merlot with dummies
ui q 319 23.39 9.46 0.00 44.60
TEi % 319 0.89 0.05 0.71 1.00
Corr. Factor ° Brix 319 -15.55 0.31 -16.32 -14.85Table 5. Demand parameter values for the simulations
Samples -> Poo led Chard onnay Mer lot
ababab
Cases:
Case 1 -168 1.97 -173 2.13 -164 1.82
Case 2 -168 3.94 -173 4.25 -164 3.63
Case 3 -168 5.91 -173 6.38 -164 5.45
Case 4 -112 1.97 -115 2.13 -109 1.82
Case 5 -112 3.94 -115 4.25 -109 3.63
Case 6 -112 5.91 -115 6.38 -109 5.45
Case 7 -56 1.97 -58 2.13 -55 1.82
Case 8 -56 3.94 -58 4.25 -55 3.63
Case 9 -56 5.91 -58 6.38 -55 5.45Table 6A. Estimated and actual quality choices
Sample Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pooled
Actual choices 966 19.78 1.40 13.20 25.40
Case 1 927 58.07 0.28 57.52 58.58
Case 2 927 36.75 0.28 36.20 37.26
Case 3 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 4 927 43.86 0.28 43.31 44.37
Case 5 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 6 927 24.91 0.28 24.36 25.42
Case 7 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 8 927 22.54 0.28 21.99 23.05
Case 9 927 20.17 0.28 19.62 20.68
Pooled with dummies
Actual choices 966 19.78 1.40 13.20 25.40
Case 1 939 58.43 1.22 55.51 60.15
Case 2 939 37.11 1.22 34.19 38.83
Case 3 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 4 939 44.22 1.22 41.30 45.93
Case 5 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 6 939 25.27 1.22 22.35 26.98
Case 7 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 8 939 22.90 1.22 19.98 24.61
Case 9 939 20.53 1.22 17.61 22.24
Chardonnay
Actual choices 636 19.58 1.29 13.20 25.40
Case 1 473 55.62 0.06 55.42 55.71
Case 2 473 35.36 0.06 35.16 35.45
Case 3 473 28.56 0.06 28.37 28.65
Case 4 473 42.00 0.06 41.80 42.09
Case 5 473 28.54 0.06 28.34 28.63
Case 6 473 24.02 0.06 23.82 24.11
Case 7 473 28.62 0.06 28.42 28.71
Case 8 473 21.83 0.06 21.63 21.92
Case 9 473 19.55 0.06 19.35 19.64Table 6B. Estimated and actual quality choices (cont.ed)
Sample Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Chardonnay with dummies
Actual choices 636 19.58 1.29 13.20 25.40
Case 1 614 56.41 1.53 52.54 58.35
Case 2 614 36.15 1.53 32.28 38.10
Case 3 614 29.35 1.53 25.49 31.30
Case 4 614 42.79 1.53 38.93 44.74
Case 5 614 29.33 1.53 25.46 31.27
Case 6 614 24.81 1.53 20.94 26.76
Case 7 614 29.41 1.53 25.55 31.36
Case 8 614 22.62 1.53 18.75 24.57
Case 9 614 20.34 1.53 16.48 22.29
Merlot
Actual choices 330 20.16 1.52 13.50 24.60
Case 1 313 60.26 0.21 59.78 60.73
Case 2 313 37.79 0.21 37.31 38.27
Case 3 313 30.25 0.21 29.77 30.72
Case 4 313 45.15 0.21 44.67 45.62
Case 5 313 30.22 0.21 29.73 30.69
Case 6 313 25.20 0.21 24.72 25.68
Case 7 313 30.31 0.21 29.83 30.79
Case 8 313 22.78 0.21 22.30 23.25
Case 9 313 20.25 0.21 19.77 20.72
Merlot with dummies
Actual choices 330 20.16 1.52 13.50 24.60
Case 1 319 60.60 0.31 59.91 61.37
Case 2 319 38.14 0.31 37.44 38.91
Case 3 319 30.60 0.31 29.90 31.36
Case 4 319 45.49 0.31 44.80 46.26
Case 5 319 30.56 0.31 29.87 31.33
Case 6 319 25.55 0.31 24.85 26.32
Case 7 319 30.66 0.31 29.96 31.43
Case 8 319 23.13 0.31 22.43 23.89
Case 9 319 20.60 0.31 19.90 21.36Table 7A. Estimated and actual pricing schemes
Sample Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pooled
Actual pricing 966 64.55 13.97 12.25 132.03
Case 1 927 -53.59 0.55 -54.68 -52.59
Case 2 927 -23.19 1.11 -25.35 -21.18
Case 3 927 7.22 1.66 3.97 10.23
Case 4 927 -25.59 0.55 -26.68 -24.59
Case 5 927 4.81 1.11 2.65 6.82
Case 6 927 35.22 1.66 31.97 38.23
Case 7 927 2.41 0.55 1.32 3.41
Case 8 927 32.81 1.11 30.65 34.82
Case 9 927 63.22 1.66 59.97 66.23
Pooled with dummies
Actual pricing 966 64.55 13.97 12.25 132.03
Case 1 939 -52.89 2.41 -58.64 -49.51
Case 2 939 -21.79 4.82 -33.27 -15.02
Case 3 939 9.32 7.22 -7.91 19.47
Case 4 939 -24.89 2.41 -30.64 -21.51
Case 5 939 6.21 4.82 -5.27 12.98
Case 6 939 37.32 7.22 20.09 47.47
Case 7 939 3.11 2.41 -2.64 6.49
Case 8 939 34.21 4.82 22.73 40.98
Case 9 939 65.32 7.22 48.09 75.47
Chardonnay
Actual pricing 636 67.62 13.63 14.05 141.69
Case 1 473 -54.54 0.14 -54.96 -54.35
Case 2 473 -22.72 0.27 -23.57 -22.34
Case 3 473 9.24 0.41 7.97 9.81
Case 4 473 -25.54 0.14 -25.96 -25.35
Case 5 473 6.28 0.27 5.43 6.66
Case 6 473 38.24 0.41 36.97 38.81
Case 7 473 2.96 0.14 2.54 3.15
Case 8 473 34.78 0.27 33.93 35.16
Case 9 473 66.74 0.41 65.47 67.31Table 7B. Estimated and actual pricing schemes
Sample Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Chardonnay with dummies
Actual pricing 636 67.62 13.63 14.05 141.69
Case 1 614 -52.85 3.25 -61.09 -48.71
Case 2 614 -19.36 6.49 -35.80 -11.09
Case 3 614 14.28 9.74 -10.38 26.70
Case 4 614 -23.85 3.25 -32.09 -19.71
Case 5 614 9.64 6.49 -6.80 17.91
Case 6 614 43.28 9.74 18.62 55.70
Case 7 614 4.65 3.25 -3.59 8.79
Case 8 614 38.14 6.49 21.70 46.41
Case 9 614 71.78 9.74 47.12 84.20
Merlot
Actual pricing 330 62.90 14.48 11.01 112.90
Case 1 313 -54.33 0.38 -55.21 -53.46
Case 2 313 -26.81 0.75 -28.56 -25.09
Case 3 313 0.87 1.13 -1.77 3.45
Case 4 313 -26.83 0.38 -27.71 -25.96
Case 5 313 0.69 0.75 -1.06 2.41
Case 6 313 28.37 1.13 25.73 30.95
Case 7 313 0.17 0.38 -0.71 1.04
Case 8 313 27.69 0.75 25.94 29.42
Case 9 313 55.37 1.13 52.73 57.95
Merlot with dummies
Actual pricing 330 62.90 14.48 11.01 112.90
Case 1 319 -53.70 0.56 -54.97 -52.30
Case 2 319 -25.55 1.13 -28.08 -22.77
Case 3 319 2.75 1.69 -1.05 6.93
Case 4 319 -26.20 0.56 -27.47 -24.80
Case 5 319 1.95 1.13 -0.58 4.73
Case 6 319 30.25 1.69 26.45 34.43
Case 7 319 0.80 0.56 -0.47 2.20
Case 8 319 28.95 1.13 26.42 31.73
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Figure 15 